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The politics of the sociology of terrorism.
The use of intelligence and counter-intelligence
by terrorist organizations
Tuðman: Last year we discussed Intelligence at the beginning of
the 21st Century. This year, we will be focussing on the events
of September 11, and the consequences they will have for
national and international security policy. This morning we
will begin with a general framework of the issue. The floor is
open.
Boyadjiev:ji I would like to start with a short slide presentation. I
recently spent a month in the States, and left New York late in
the evening on September 10 with the last Lufthansa flight,
just hours before the airport was closed. By chance I was tak-
ing pictures of the Twin Towers on September 10 from the
other side of the Hudson river just before leaving around
5.00 pm. I was in the air when the tragedy occurred. I felt
guilty to some extent that we, the professionals, had allowed
such a thing to happen. I’m sure we’ll discuss this later. I col-
lected some unique slides from the Internet and would like to
start our meeting with a visualization of the tragic events that
have provided the incentive for meetings such as this all over
the world (slides are shown). 
Since September 11, the world has changed radically and it
is not necessary to explain why. What can we now expect?
International terrorism is on the move. Many assumptions are
no longer valid. Many elements of national security doctrine
seem obsolete now and need to be changed. We can expect
an increase in left-wing, right-wing, religious, antiglobalist,
minority, nationalistic, and other forms of radicalism, and
new types of attacks. Before starting the discussion I would
like to show you something else. It’s called the ‘Handbook
for the Dedicated Terrorist’ and it is based on the way of12
thinking and ideology of the Basque terrorist organization,
ETA, presented by one of its leaders, Ricardo Garcia. I took
some points from it to provide an overview of their philoso-
phy and operations. What do they consider their main
weapons and means to perform terrorist acts and reach their
goals? What do the terrorists believe in? 
The first weapon, according to Ricardo Garcia, is motive,
and he lists several rules: 1) Do not kill without motive; 2)
your reasons for acting must be shared by others; 3) Be an
honorable David against the Goliaths; 4) All rationales are
valid; 5) Seek the support of reliable people; 6) Keep attack-
ing until victory is achieved. 
The second weapon is efficiency, and the rules are: 7)
Perform the violence with the precision of brain surgery (the
tragedy on September 11 was performed in this manner); 8)
A dead dog doesn’t bite; 9) fast, confident and cheerful; 10)
Be mercurial and militant; 11) Prepare ‘the picture’, the
background; 12) Keep that ‘patriotic flame’ or religious
flame burning; 13) The people’s cause always is a good
cause; pretend to be fighting for a real cause; 14) Kill with
your brain; 15) God is accepted for he punishes and for-
gives; 16) Throw the stone and hide the hand. 17) Plan the
terrorism like seeds. 18) Cleverness and caution (it’s foolish
to put your head in the lion’s mouth); 19) Discretion; and 21)
When you hunt deer, don’t settle for a hare. 
The third weapon of the terrorists, according to Ricardo
Garcia, is the moral weapon: 22) Who defines the morals?;
23) Let the circumstances be your shield; 24) Cover yourself
in the cloak of ‘progress’; 25) The violence will never appear
necessary unless it is committed; 26) A drop of oil leaves a
bigger stain than a bucket of water; 27) In the name of
peace; 28) To harvest you must also sow; 29) Little streams
make great rivers; and last 30) Do not forget that the hang-
man can also be hanged. 
Dedijer: ij What is your source?
Boyadjiev:ji These are quotations from the Philosophy of Ricardo
Garcia, the chief ideologist of the Basque terrorist organiza-
tion ETA.
Dedijer: ij Who published it?
Boyadjiev:ji Somebody found it in Spanish and translated it into
Bulgarian, and I got it from him.
Kerr: The only comment I’d have is that it seems to me ETA has
violated all the fundamental principles you just laid out. They
violated their own guidelines, because if you look where ETA
is right now, it’s lost any popular support. It has very little pop-
ular support.
Boyadjiev: ji This was not written recently, but years ago. 13
Kerr: They didn’t follow their own creed very well.
Smith:i You’re right that they did break all their rules. However, I
think that the terrorists probably thought they were following
their rules. We must remember that most people, but partic-
ularly fanatics, are able to convince themselves that what they
are doing is right and consistent with their own rules. They set
up rules and they believe they’re following them.
Boyadjiev:ji Since we will be talking about the politics and sociol-
ogy of terrorism, I thought it would be interesting to share
this. 
Tuðman: There is probably an explanation for that. Do you know
what year it was published?
Boyadjiev:ji I do not know exactly; probably about 10 years ago.
Tuðman: That is exactly what I would like to discuss. The impact
of terrorism on international security policy. Why is September
11  so significant? Because this is probably the first time ter-
rorism became a global activity. Terrorists are attacking
strategic targets using methods and techniques offered by the
global market. That is why the character and nature of ter-
rorist activities are changing; globalization is being utilized.
Terrorism has become an international activity, because it is
financed in one country, training takes place in another, and
in a third, the operation is performed. So it is not just nation-
al anymore; international borders have been crossed. So now
we have to find new answers for old problems, but in a com-
pletely new global context. 
From that point of view, we can also evaluate international
security policy, and contemporary security problems and
international conflicts. The case of southeast Europe and the
former Yugoslavia, for example. Even today, there is no clear
understanding of the sources of the conflict. Why did it hap-
pen and what was the background? Without this understand-
ing, there can be no proper diagnosis of the situation. The
international community could not reach agreement on its
objectives or on ways to resolve the crisis. How to manage
the crisis does not mean how to resolve the crisis. The system
of international security is not designed to resolve the prob-
lem. The same problem applies to military management. The
military, in my experience during the last ten years, was advo-
cating political solutions. But the most we can say is that
some countries are supporting terrorism in one way or anoth-
er and that terrorist activities today are adapting themselves
to the global environment and using its resources. We see
that terrorists do not care anymore about the consequences.
The focus now is not on threatening somebody, but protect-
ing ourselves and our interests. Another threat which has
developed as the result of global terrorist activities is that14
today the lines are blurred between national, public, external,
and internal security. That is important because services are
divided along that principle. If we change this, the internal
and external division among the services is in question. The
intervention by NATO was rationalized according to Article 5,
which talks not about attacks from another state or country,
but about protection of NATO itself. Another point is that no
country can fight terrorism alone. That means we need to
interpret partnership in another way. I believe that the basic
principle of international, bilateral, and multilateral relations
today is the application of pressure. I don’t believe that pres-
sure should be a guiding principle because pressure, by def-
inition, is legalized force applied by entity against another.
Obviously there are overlapping and conflicting national
interests, but how do we resolve this? Today the world order
can be described somewhere between a multiple and
monopolar system, because America is the biggest country
wielding the greatest influence on the world order. The prob-
lem is that individual human rights are being transformed into
universal human rights, and imposed upon all the other
countries of the world. Many of these individual human rights
are not suited to Europe, and other countries do not accept
these definitions. If the approach is that certain principles or
definitions are superior to all others and should be imposed
on everyone else, then we have a problem. That leads to neg-
ative consequences. If we are talking about national security,
intelligence, and threats of international terrorism, we have to
think within a global framework. The world is at a turning
point, but what kind of new world order can we expect? What
do we want? The bipolar world disappeared during the
1990s. For decades now, the Security Council has represent-
ed only those countries who wield the most power and influ-
ence. Without a consensus between all the countries, our task
will be impossible.
Dedijer:ij On September 12, I wrote down three pages of notes,
and posed three questions. What is terrorism? What causes
it? How can we fight it? And I’m going to apply these three
questions to the September 11  terrorist attack. It may just be
an illusion but it seems to me there have never been so many
people living in freedom in the world as there are today, so
many people who have been freed from their chains.
Terrorism comes from those who have not been freed. The lit-
tle group says ‘I’m going to speak on behalf of my commu-
nity. I want them to be free. I don’t have tanks and I don’t
have planes. I don’t have any weapons except terror. I’m
going to use that.’ The interesting thing is that suddenly we
have Putin and Russia joining the war against terrorism. I read15
in Le Monde a long article about two significant minorities in
China who have announced a terrorist attack against the
Chinese government. They want freedom from China, just as
Chechnya wants freedom from Russia. And the ETA from
Spain. The Irish have been fighting the English for 180 years.
The United States’ struggle for freedom began with a terror-
ist act and a bunch of people going to Boston and refusing
to pay the British. We have to consider what causes terrorism
and who are the people it engages. 
Tuðman: There is a problem with such an explanation. In the
September 11 events, there was no political objective, and
nobody knows who exactly is behind it. The group behind it
is not asking for anyone to be freed and anything like that.
They are just making threats. I think we can expect to see
more terrorist activity using the resources of a globalized
world to threaten vital world centers, and committed by a
group of people who are simply dissatisfied with something;
for example, how wealth is distributed in their country. 
Kerr: It seems to me that the terrorists involved in September 11
were fundamentally different, at least in terms of motivation,
than terrorists in Ireland and other countries. I think you’re
right, Miro; I think that for the most part terrorism has had
specific objectives: changes in government, independence,
liberation, or ethnic separation. In some ways I think one can
look at September 11  more historically as anarchism aimed
at destruction. Like the anarchists of the late 1800’s and the
early 1900’s, those involved in the September 11  event were
not trying to change the government to something else. They
were trying to destroy government. They were trying to destroy
a global order they felt was for a variety of reasons evil, but
their goal was not to overthrow the government. They were
trying to cause instability and panic.
Lange: I would like to comment. We have to distinguish between
classical terrorism and new terrorism. Classical terrorism
aims at destabilizing a specific system by attacking its repre-
sentatives. In many ways, classical terrorism has tried to go
for hard targets. Of course there is always collateral damage,
but this is not the intention. Now we are seeing something
completely new. Concerning September 1l , there is no visi-
ble system which was destabilized by this action. I think at this
stage we know much less than we believe we know. Of
course, we know the people involved had a link to Islam. But
I doubt that the people sitting on the planes were the ones
who planned the operation. I also do not believe that Mr. Bin
Laden was coordinating each phase from faraway
Afghanistan. There is more behind it. Just for the sake of ter-
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minology, I think we should distinguish between classical ter-
rorism and new terrorism, even though we do not really know
yet what new terrorism is. But the ETA, IRA, and Red Brigades
were something else.
Tuðman: In a globalized world, it’s difficult to identify the leader
or organizer of the action. Everybody uses Internet, but who’s
in control of the Internet. Who are the users? It is difficult to
locate and identify them. That is one of the main problems
with the new terrorism. 
Lange: Just one additional remark. I feel it is important to differ-
entiate between soft and hard targets when it comes to fight-
ing new terrorism. In the case of classical terrorism, you knew
vaguely what the targets would be; now you don’t know. This
has consequences for the struggle against new terrorism. We
will have to make radical changes in organization and per-
sonnel. This is a precondition for success. Changes will have
to be more radical than we think.
Luèic:i Classical terrorism has the aim of waging war against a
certain state or authority. New age terrorism, meaning Islamic
terrorism, is attempting to halt the process of globalisation.
That is the crucial difference between the two.
Dedijer:ij Conflicts among civilizations cannot motivate twenty
people to sacrifice their lives, sit in a plane, and hit targets.
This idea of somebody overthrowing western civilization is
nonsense. You can’t overthrow a civilization. But this is a con-
crete case of a terrorist act with a political background.
Cosic:i After September 11, I gave an interview to a Croatian
newspaper here in Zagreb. The objective was to discuss and
identify some unexpected technical and technological
changes in the world of terrorism at the beginning of the 21st
century. In the interview, I introduced terms like smart terror-
ists, well-educated terrorists, high-tech terrorism, etc. I was
surprised later when I saw that the terrorism we witnessed on
September 11 was committed by well trained, well-educated
and extremely well- organized terrorist cells. The complexity
and quality of their training, recruiting methods, coordination
and synchronization, low profile preparation, communication
and action, autonomy in target selections, and team leader-
ship were amazing. What contributed most to their success
was the fact that they were unknown for a long period to the
majority of intelligence organizations. The training technolo-
gy they had at their disposal was really high-tech in compar-
ison with classical terrorism training methods; for example,
flight simulators to practice various flight missions without any
government surveillance and so on. So they had the infra-
structure necessary to generate the skills they needed to suc-
cessfully execute the terrorism missions, including financial17
support, civilian communication, infrastructure, and Internet.
We know know we were mistaken about the infrastructure the
terrorists have at their disposal. The main threat now, in the
age of information, is the abuse of modern technologies for
purposes of terrorism.
Ferš: I would like to return to three questions we posed earlier.
What is terrorism, what caused it, and how do terrorists oper-
ate? We agree that the world has changed during the last
year, but that terrorism is nothing new. When I prepared my
remarks for this conference I tried to formulate a concrete
definition for terrorism. I must admit that I failed. In the past
we had a different definition, but as the world changed, the
definition changed. We knew how to define it in 1933 in the
League of Nations. Crime and terrorism were at that time syn-
onymous. Then later, in 1983, the United States US Code,
Section 2625 £ (d) came up with a different definition. And
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has yet another definition.
But I think that after September 11, the European
Commission and the Security Council have devised a good
definition for international terrorism as a new phenomenon,
and have separated this type of international terrorism from
other extreme acts of the past. I think there is a difference
between so-called national terrorism and extremism. What
we have now is not terrorism, but extremism. Why has this
type of international terrorism appeared now? Some say the
people who aren’t free or don’t feel free are the ones who
commit this terrorism. Maybe this is accurate; they are impris-
oned in their minds. Yesterday we spoke about this, and I
think we came up with a good explanation. Most of the world
is uneducated, but many have money. Without money there
can be no terrorism. Everything is an expense. But what is
important is that they are unable to participate in world poli-
tics. They are segregated in one part of the world and have
no opportunity to create policy. 
Wolf:l I fully agree with the way Stevan and the last speaker from
Slovenia, Mr. Ferš, analyzed the problem. No question, the
well-organized, terrible terrorist attacks of September 11th
opened a new page in the history of terrorism and raised new
questions about how to combat it. But I don’t agree that it’s
a totally new situation in terms of terrorism, and I think we
should discuss a revamped strategy for the intelligence serv-
ices which addresses the new aspects of international terror-
ism. There have been numerous examples of terrorism in the
20th century, but since the 1970s, it has become a central
focus for intelligence services in the East and West, who have
the task of reconnaissance, infiltration and, if possible, para-
lyzing the opponent.  If a division were made between classic18
terrorism and a totally new terrorism, it would be difficult to
formulate a strategy. In the past, there was a big difference in
the approaches used by the socialist and Western countries.
What did they consider terrorism? Their views were different.
In socialist countries, top priority was given to hijack attempts
by people trying to flee those countries. But there were also
terrorist occupations of embassies and attacks against people
or objects. From the point of view of western countries, par-
ticularly the United States, every national movement in Africa
or PLO was regarded as a terrorist organization, Yassir Arafat
was the head of terrorism, and so on. There were national
aspects; for example, the IRA or ETA, but there were also
international aspects, and communication existed between
the different terrorist entities. Now of course we have to con-
sider the Muslims, Bin Laden, and his kind of organization,
but if we limit our attention to them, I think it will be difficult
to find a real strategy.
The first reactions of the American people, the American
administration, and the American president after the terrible
attacks in New York and Washington are understandable. But
after the declaration of war and the implementation of mili-
tary measures, reactions have changed. Of course it is a
political question, and the politicians must decide if it is pos-
sible to combat international terrorism with war and consider
the consequences. President Bush’s declared war aims were
very vague, and lacked a clear definition of goals and a strat-
egy for the intelligence services. 
We will discuss today and tomorrow methods and problems
of cooperation, but the aims must be declared clearly. Now
there is confusion among the politicians as to whether Iraq is
a war aim or not, whether Iraq is involved in the terrorist
activities, and in Bin Laden’s terrorist organization or other
organizations of this kind. This is a difficult question which
requires an answer, and the services must inform the politi-
cians so that they have a clear picture. Only if the aims are
clearly defined can a strategy be formulated by the services
to combat international terorrism. We need at least an
abstract division in order to analyze the new problems and
utilize the existing information. Who decides where the cen-
ters of international terrorism are? What countries support
international terrorism? Should only one government have
the power to declare which countries are terrorist? This is a
difficult problem. The main goal is to find a strategy that pro-
vides a clear analysis of the situation. But international ter-
rorism cannot be defeated over a short time period by war.
We will be confronted with international terrorism the rest of
our lives.19
Kerr: I tend to agree with this question of definition. First of all the
definition of terrorism depends where you sit.  From an
American perspective, I can tell you September 11 is quite
different. This is the first major attack inside the United States.
People around this table have had that experience, but it is
new to the US. The attacks on the US embassies in Africa, the
barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole involved US per-
sonnel overseas. That is seen as an acceptable risk when you
send your military forces and civilian representatives abroad.
But when it happens in the United States it changes everything
for us. Calling it a war is a way to mobilize the country to a
full effort. Unfortunately, the term war is not a good one
because you win or lose wars. We’re not going to lose this
war, I’ll tell you. I’m not sure how you win it precisely, but
we’re not going to lose it. But from an American perspective
it would be a mistake for you not to think of it as a war. It is
seen that way and that means that when the president says
you’re either with us or you’re for them, he means it and so
do the American people.  
Dedijer:ij This is the first attack on the United States since 1814,
when the great-grandfather of a friend of mine, Scott Gerald
Cockburn, burned down the White House. Since then, the
United States had not been attacked until September 11th.
We understand the psychological reaction. There are two
reactions. One is from the gut. I am going to kill him! That’s
one reaction. The other is a policy reaction, a US change of
policy, and I will discuss this later. 
Boyadjiev:ji I want to react to what Dick Kerr said. Emotionally
speaking, yes, it is a war. It is a war for the American people.
Politically speaking and internationally speaking, it’s a reac-
tion against terrorism. It has its political and economic com-
ponent, and there is cooperation between police and intelli-
gence services, with war as the military reaction. I put war in
last place as a reaction against terrorism. We still do not have
a uniformly accepted definition of terrorism. I believe a dou-
ble standard regarding terrorism still exists and that’s not only
when we talk about the past, but also the present. One of the
things that we have to agree upon during the first, political
stage of cooperation is to accept a common definition for
international terrorism. I know it’s difficult, but without one, it
will be impossible to fight the common enemy, terrorism, as
a joint entity. And several more things. Drago Ferš mentioned
that terrorism needs money. Here I want to suggest another
topic for discussion. Terrorism not only needs money, terror-
ism makes money, a lot of dirty money. I’ll give an example
and I dare anyone to say that I am wrong. For the month
before September 11, banking analyses in the States showed20
that options to buy shares in United Airlines, American
Airlines, and some insurance companies ranged somewhere
about 240 – 270 per day. On the September 10, there were
2800 options to buy shares of those companies during the
upcoming week. For me, that is an indication that not only
Bin Laden but many other parties knew that the shares of the
airline and insurance companies would fall. So terrorism for
me has a financial side: making money. A large part of it will
finance further terrorism, but another part of it makes dirty
profits, and it ought to be punished. 
Meðimorec:i Every one of us fully supports the United States in the
war against terrorism; there is no doubt that we all oppose
terrorism. But if I may say – there are two different perceptions
of terrorism: that of the USA and that of many other countries
which are willing to fight terrorism, but also want to investi-
gate the sources of its growth and expansion. Are the roots in
the economic gap between the rich and poor, cultural and
religious differences, poverty, or political inconsistencies?
Different civilizations? When we try to identify the sources and
nature of terrorism, we are, metaphorically speaking, passing
through a murky forest where we’ll be confronted by all sorts
of hobgoblins. There are many obstacles to reaching a clear
understanding of the terrorism phenomena. In the Croatian
media, terrorism has been analyzed from a philosophical,
sociological, religious, and historical point of view – it has
been given a political perspective. Huntington and Fukuyama
are often quoted. We are eager to understand the causes of
terrorism. There was some of it during the national liberation
processes of nations during the disintegration of former
Yugoslavia. Terrorism, disguised as humanitarian aid and aid
to resist communism and Serbian hegemony, appeared in
Croatia in 1992 at the beginning of the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. As the disintegration of Yugoslavia progressed,
it moved to Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and even
to southern Serbia. Terrorism has shown another face – that
of the national liberation movements both in Kosovo and
Macedonia. Terrorists, with foreign financial aid, have mis-
used and compromised a just cause: Albanian national liber-
ation from the harsh rule of Serbia. Should we call all
Albanians terrorists if the majority of the Albanian population
opposes terrorism and its methods? It is not simple and clear.
Terrorism can have a ‘legal face’ as well. It can present itself
in a humanitarian and social role, using cultural and religious
methods of operation. Though many terrorist methods are
already known, it is distinguish villains from true humanitari-
an or social workers. We must take all these elements into
consideration when analyzing and trying to understand ter-21
rorism. It can be the driving force behind actions of enslaved,
impoverished, humiliated, and desperate people. Terrorism
can be committed in the name of ideas like Huntington’s ‘The
Clash of Civilizations’, and can collect or even steal money
for revolutionary purposes. It can also be backed by extreme
political ideas. We should talk about all these disguises ter-
rorism utilizes because this will help us uncover its true nature.
And it is not a simple task.
Smith:i There are different kinds of terrorist outbreaks. In this case
I think the Bin Laden terrorist attacks are in some ways simi-
lar to the outbreaks of violence in the Middle Ages in Europe
and Asia, wherein peasants rebelled in a most destructive way
but lacked a program; they were just rebelling against a situ-
ation they considered intolerable. They attacked whatever
power structure existed because that power structure was not
treating them well or because it was the only thing to attack.
Inevitably the rebellion was crushed and the movement died.
There are some similarites between the medieval revolts and
the Bin Laden attacks [both are fighting against things they
don’t understand] but there are also great differences. And
the Bin Laden problem will not disappear quickly. It is a major
problem; it will go on for a long time and our children will
probably also have to deal with it. Whether we like it or not,
it is a kind of clash between civilizations. But by a combina-
tion of firmness, often involving military force, [and good
international cooperation] and understanding of cultural dif-
ferences, we will prevail. As always in such cases it is impor-
tant to understand the motivation of the terrorists so that the
appropriate strategy can be devised. 
I would like to make another point. Bush’s declaration of war
was both necessary politically [to mobilize America first and
then the world] and morally correct. Americans were terribly
mad; if Bush had not acted as he did the country’s morale
would have been destroyed. The question of Iraq is a sepa-
rate question but Iraq is certainly part of the terrorist problem.
In all likelihood, Iraq was responsible for the first attack on
the World Trade Center. Saddam’s Iraq is known to support
and train terrorists and to have used them extensively for their
own purposes. Saddam tried to blow up Bush’s father in
1992 when Bush visited Kuwait. Saddam is unquestionably a
user and supporter of terrorism and is also directing an exten-
sive program to develop weapons of mass destruction. I think
that we would be irresponsible if we allow Saddam to contin-
ue to develop weapons of mass destruction and support ter-
rorism. If we did, the result would be an attack even more
destructive than that on the World Trade Center. We knew
that Bin Laden was planning something, we knew he was a22
terrorist leader, we knew he had a worldwide link and a
worldwide organization. Unfortunately it took this massive
attack to mobilize the Americans to do something about it. I
think once mobilized there will be a movement led by
America to destroy terrorist capabilities around the world,
including that of terrorist states. Iraq is a brutal dictatorship.
If we don’t do something about them, they may well attack
the United States suddenly and without warning, like the
attack on Pearl Harbor, only much worse. To summarize, as
the leader of the United States, Bush was absolutely right to
react the way he did. In marked contrast to the way his pred-
ecessor handled Bin Laden attacks, Bush has been thought-
ful, effective and relentless. He devised a strategy and then
acted. He did not merely shoot missiles the next day and then
ignore the problem.
Tuðman: The focus should be to keep the nation together and
create political support for actions aimed at protecting
national interests and values. But will the same principles be
used to evaluate how other nations react in a similar situa-
tion? That is international security policy’s main problem.
Today every government in the world is reacting against ter-
rorism on a political or professional level. But I would like to
stress once again a need for vision in international security
policy. And that vision can be developed and accepted only
if all principles are equally valid for everyone.
Smith:i Those terms are very hard to come by.
Tuðman: Of course.
Kerr: But I would disagree with you in a sense. I think you under-
estimate the implications of September 11 for larger US pol-
icy, even beyond terrorism. What that brought to the front is
that we waited until we were attacked and then responded. I
think you will find the United States is going to be much more
proactive in dealing with future threats, whether they are
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The US is not
going to wait until it is attacked to respond. It is going to be
very aggressive and identify direct threats beyond terrorism in
the area of weapons of mass destruction and so on. In infor-
mation warfare against the United States we are also going
to be more aggressive. So if you think we’re going to be pas-
sive in the future about actions like this, I think you’re mistak-
en. 
Tuðman: My comment was more an observation on some prior
events, not on that one. But if the United States is going to act
alone, then September 11 will be interpreted as a threat
against only the United States. In that case, we would have
23
one type of international security system. If a system of inter-
national security is organized to protect most or all other
countries, then the system will be different. That is the dilem-
ma we are faced with.
Kerr: I think we will act alone; we would prefer to act in concert
but if not, we will act alone. I think it is of sufficient urgency
and importance. We would prefer the former, but we will do
the latter.
Dedijer:ij This morning President Bush stated that Iraq is almost an
enemy.
Kerr: It’s not almost, it is.
Dedijer:ij Tony Blair said ‘no, let’s finish Afghanistan first. Let’s for-
get Iraq.’ Chirac just shrugged his shoulders. So if the United
States wants to go alone, what can we do about it. 
Luèic:i Blair said that yesterday, but he changed his mind today.
There is a problem in defining terrorism. Different agencies
have different definitions. United States DOD, State
Department, and FBI all have different definitions because
they stand on different ground. Here we also have different
views, because we are looking at the problem from different
points of view:  the European, the small countries, and the
US. 
I can give you an interesting example – a car bomb explosion
in Mostar, BiH in 1997 that went off and destroyed 94 apart-
ments, 96 cars, 13 businesses, shops and stores, wounded 3
people seriously and approximately 40 lightly. Police con-
ducted an investigation and arrested a Saudi, Ahmad Zuhair.
Zuhair went to trial but the court didn’t even consider charg-
ing him with terrorism, because in Bosnia and Herzegovina
you can only be charged with terrorism if you deemed to be
working against Bosnia and Herzegovina interests. Zuhair
was a Mujahedeen in the 3rd Corps of Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina; he came to BiH to fight for BiH; therefore it was
ruled he could not be considered its enemy! That was the
position Zuhair’s attorney argued and the Court accepted it.
Zuhair was found guilty not of terrorism but of disturbing pub-
lic order and possessing illegal substances. Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s law still states that it is a crime to act against a
foreign state, international organization, or liberation move-
ment! This article is the same as in ex-Yugoslavia, which
cooperated closely with a number of so-called, liberation
movements.
This is a completely different point of view than that of the US
or Europe. 
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Kerr: I believe international law considers terrorism to be indis-
criminate attacks on civilians without a military objective.
Attacks on military or government facilities during a war are
not considered terrorism.
Kerr: Over the past eight years, there have been several major
terrorist attacks on US facilities. In Africa, the Embassies, the
Saudi barracks, and the USS Cole.The US approach to those
problems has been fundamentally legalistic. It has chosen to
pursue the terrorist using the FBI and legal means to bring
terrorists to the courts. It did at one point send some missiles
into Afghanistan in a token response, but its real response
has been in the courts. As a result of the court action, there
has been an extraordinary amount of information published
in the press, particularly during the trial of the people in New
York following the first bombing of the New York Trade
Center. Nearly all the information on how we identify the ter-
rorists, how they were tracked, how they were followed
through cell phones, computers, and money transfers was
revealed. They were tracked after the fact, of course, but we
talked about how law enforcement began to study the tech-
niques they use to get into the United States. How they got
through immigration, how they used their passports, how they
moved money, how they communicated, how they planned;
all of this was laid out in great detail in the courts. It was also
done in later investigations, so whoever wants a blueprint on
how we track and found the terrorists has a great one here.
Even the dumbest of us could figure out how to avoid intelli-
gence surveillance, and these terrorists are not dumb. I don’t
think they are geniuses, but they are smart, worldly, and
clever enough to understand how to use our collection tech-
niques against us, how to avoid being tracked, and how to
avoid being caught. We not only told them how to get into
the country undetected, we also told them what things we
could not do well and things that we wished we would have
done. In typical American fashion we gave them all the infor-
mation they needed to avoid us. They also understood better
then we the disconnect between foreign and domestic intelli-
gence. It was easy to operate in the United States, to build an
infrastructure, and to operate relatively free without detection
from the authorities. The Iranians had quite a comprehensive
infrastructure in the 1980s throughout the United States.
Nearly every nationality is represented; there are close ties
between major populations of foreign born groups, so almost
every country has a infrastructure in which they can operate.
Before 1990, people didn’t understand how easy it was to
operate in the United States. Foreigners believed we were far
better at domestic surveillance monitoring than we were. We25
looked better than we really were. You could do a lot of
things below our level of surveillance in the United States. I
think they realized after the bombings in Africa, Saudi Arabia,
and USS Cole that it was a very porous society. It was easy to
get in and out, and our system for passports and immigration
was fairly shoddy.The various organizations like the
Nationalization Service and Customs do not communicate
with each other. Foreign intelligence, despite its shortcom-
ings, and certainly major shortcomings prior to 11 September
11 , had information that the US was targeted and that there
was a real potential for attack inside the country.
Fundamentally, civilian organizations lack the culture of intel-
ligence organizations; they don’t know how to organize
analysis, they don’t know how to disseminate information to
each other or pass information across organizational lines
and cooperate on operational activities. They have a long
way to go, and I think it’s problematic just how effective it’s
going to be. Not only because of the level of difficulty, but
because those who feel strongly about social rights, human
rights, and legal freedom in the United States are going to be
very concerned about an internal police force. The United
States citizens have always opposed a national police con-
necting everybody. They like it the way it is now with just cities,
counties, and states acting independently. Most of these
organizations lack experience in information processing.
Boyadjiev:ji After your brilliant introduction, Dick, I would say that
we had read each other’s minds if I believed in extra-senso-
ry perception. But we are thinking on the same wave length,
because I wanted to summarize everything you said into a few
sentences myself. 
One thing that was clearly demonstrated on September 11
was the fact that the terrorists took full advantage of all the
achievements of democracy - mobile phones, credit cards,
technologies, and information. They did not need a special
intelligence structure to get the information you mentioned.
They took it from newspapers, Internet and so on. The terror-
ists have at their disposal all or most of the information they
need to plan acts which result in such devastation. You raised
another question I was going to raise as a discussion topic:
the boundary between rights on one side and regulations and
limitations on the other. Since we are living in a new and
changed world, a new balance between liberties and human
rights, and regulations and limitations must be achieved. We
cannot afford to make available information that can be used
for evil purposes. It’s a matter of discussion, but I am afraid
that’s one of the big problems humanity, civilization, and
democracy are going to face. I recall something that Mark26
Twain wrote many years ago: ‘The American people have
many rights, plus the wisdom not to use all of them’.  It’s
probably time now to figure out how to best use these rights
and liberties. The way this issue is addressed in the United
States will influence the entire civilized world. It will produce
a lot of negative reaction but we must find a balance. 
My contribution to the discussion we are going to start now is
based on a specific case in which I was heavily involved in
late 1990- early 1991 prior to the Desert Storm operation in
Iraq. At that time, I was Executive Secretary (deputy minister)
in the Ministry of the Interior. Bulgarian Intelligence got a sig-
nal that an international terrorist group was preparing a rock-
et attack on a certain foreign embassy in Sofia. The interna-
tional terrorist group had been operating outside of Bulgaria
and in Sofia, and consisted of a Japanese member of the
Japanese Red Army, a Philippine from a Philippine terrorist
organization, a Palestinian Arab, and money coming from
Colombia, South America. It was an entirely new pattern of
terrorism with an indication of international backing from
Saddam Hussein. After picking up that signal, our service
exchanged it with partner services. The result was true inter-
national cooperation between representatives of several for-
eign services. The terrorist operation did not transpire that
time, but it illustrated several things. First of all, it demon-
strated a new form of terrorist internationalism. A wide vari-
ety of different groups, with different aims, combined to per-
form an operation against the United States on Bulgarian
soil. Financing was coming from new, unexpected sources.
Many of the mechanisms of the planned operation were not
discovered, but it still showed that international terrorism was
on the move. I do not make a parallel here between this and
what happened on September 11th. But one of the conclu-
sions I would like to draw is that we cannot oppose interna-
tional terrorism if we do not internationalize our efforts to
fight it. New forms of cooperation are needed. For many
years I characterized what was needed by using a variation of
the old-new ‘slogan’: ‘Spies of the world, unite!’ I say this
because I disagree with the opposing view: ‘If you’re not with
us,we’ll do it alone.’ One entity cannot fight everything and
everybody around the world. We need to cooperate. So it is
better to look for new ways to cooperate. 
I will go back to the operation I was talking about to cover
one more aspect. How did the terrorists get their information?
It turned out that they didn’t need a lot of intelligence and
counterintelligence. They just needed a corrupt customs offi-
cer at the border to import the weapons, bring the rocket and
launchers, and prepare the operation. It was not that difficult27
to engage a co-conspirator in Bulgaria to rent an apartment
with a direct line of vision to the Embassy. Sophisticated intel-
ligence or connections in the Bulgarian or Foreign
Intelligence services were not needed. The terrorist organiza-
tion once again took full advantage of the liberties within
democratic societies. Using public information, they can pre-
dict repercussions, learn how to avoid them, and operate on
another plane. 
I suspect at one point that someone played a bad joke on the
CIA. Director George Tenet once said that the CIA’s classic
mission is to separate fact from fiction. I suspect there was
some information coming through the information channels
which was probably considered too far-fetched and, instead
of continuing through the channels, was blocked somewhere
in the middle. 
Kerr: I think there was generalized information about the threat.
It was not specific information. It is quite clear that all the
pieces were not put together as well as they should have
been, both by foreign intelligence and certainly by the FBI
and the people inside. I don’t think it was a question of it not
going forward, I think it was a question of less than complete
analysis and more fragmentary information. In hindsight, a
lot of things were seen that made sense. Hindsight’s a mar-
velous thing. Sometimes things that seemed disconnected
before look different and fit together perfectly after the fact.
So it looks a lot better in hindsight than it did at first. I think
your description is a very complete one in terms of the nature
of the terrorist ability to use our information against us. Then
it kind of goes back to the point that was made earlier on
technology. You don’t want to think of them as masterminds,
because they were using technology that was available to
everybody. They just used it rather cleverly.
Dedijer:ij I have a question of Mssrs. Kerr and Smith. What was the
reaction of your intelligence colleagues on September 11th?
How did they react? Were they surprised? A little more diffi-
cult question is: how is the United States intelligence commu-
nity going to change? Now, what you said about internal
security sounds like something President Truman said when
establishing the CIA. It’s easy for the Communist countries.
They can control everything, stop everything, say anything,
provide no information, and so on. Now is that the way you
want to go? What was your reaction to the event and how is
the community going to change, in your personal opinion?
Smith: i My reaction was anger because I thought we had not done
a good job collecting intelligence, and I think the answer is,
we don’t have to reorganize, what we have to do is get bet-
ter. We have to stop doing some of things that we were doing,28
like social things and making sure that everyone gets pro-
moted, all sexes and all races and that sort of stuff. What we
have to do is return to being very good human intelligence
officers. We have to make a greater effort to get sources
because what you need in intelligence service is sources and
I don’t think have enough sources. That’s what we have to
do.
Kerr: I was going to answer his question. I would agree, but
would say my first reaction was that it was a disaster because
intelligence did not accomplish its fundamental mission. I
also believe that law enforcement, policy people, and many
others bear responsibility. But intelligence is the first line of
defense and it failed to do what it is supposed to do. The rea-
son it was less effective is scale. The size of the CIA and the
cost of operations against terrorism were small scale. The
intelligence effort by analysts and overseas operations con-
ducted against terrorism is far less than the cost of a single
US carrier. Put into the context of US Defense activity and US
defense spending, intelligence is cheap. If you’re going to do
the kinds of things that Doug is talking about, you need to put
much more effort into it, you need more expertise and human
intelligence, and you need more sophisticated counterintelli-
gence and analysis. We’ve been unwilling meet the costs.
Cosic:i How can we improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the
intelligence community? I am definitely not an expert, but in
papers I wrote a couple of years ago about integrated strate-
gic approaches to regional conflict management, I presented
ideas that could be useful as early warning tools in the war
against terrorism. New analytical tools and methods can help
predict potential terrorist attacks. The problems are complex
so a new creative use of the methods and tools is needed.
The scientific community and decision makers have to be
more involved. And better education and training is the best
preparation for preventing and eliminating terrorism.
Integration and coordination of information, analytical pro-
cessing of information, and decision-making must be
improved as well. This means closer cooperation between
agents in charge of collecting information and analysts
responsible for processing of information with decision mak-
ers. The design and development of systems with built-in data
could also be effective in the war against terrorism. And final-
ly, decision makers are often political appointees who have
different views, personal interests, and preferences, but coop-
eration between these key players is necessary to improve the
quality of the intelligence community.
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Tuðman: I would like to comment on two things. The first con-
cerns the reaction of the American government. We can
understand the reaction by the use of two criteria. There is still
a need to make a distinction between defense and security.
Defense is something that is primarily the obligation of the
country itself. Each country does everything possible to
defend itself, but security is a question of partnership and
cooperation. So there are two different levels, and how to
balance and combine those two approaches is dependent on
the skills of the politicians. The second thing is, I believe that
terrorist groups do need intelligence and counterintelligence.
If we agree that terrorist activities have changed and are now
oriented toward strategic targets, then they need intelligence,
need to know how to recognize the target, and approach and
destroy it. So it is reasonable to expect they will develop cer-
tain types of intelligence. For example, a possible target for a
large number of dissatisfied people could be international or
national data banks (governmental, military, financial, scien-
tific, cultural, etc.). What then? There would not necessarily
be physical destruction and killing of people, but data banks
and such would be destroyed. It’s also reasonable to expect
that terrorist groups will develop counterintelligence, because
certain security measures must be undertaken now by a num-
ber of countries; for example, controlling the Internet. And we
learned that even the September 11 terrorists were using the
Internet. That means protection of communications, but also
counterintelligence protection. 
Boyadjiev:ji Before giving the floor to our colleague, Markus Wolf,
I would like to make a short comment. I agree with Miro.
What I meant was that thus far terrorists have obtained much
of the information needed to achieve their purposes ‘for
free’. In the future, we’re going to face more and more ter-
rorist intelligence and counterintelligence. If they are really
Enemy Number One now, everybody will be trying to get
agents into their circles. So they will develop more counterin-
telligence. With limitations on the dissemination of informa-
tion, they will need more intelligence. I’ll mention just one of
the hypotheses advanced in the newspapers. It was claimed
that for September 11, the terrorists obtained information
from a Japanese construction company about where and
how to hit the twin towers in New York to cause the greatest
damage and the collapse of the structures.
Tuðman: There was a movie on the bombing of the twin towers
made in the 1990s. They said only an airplane of that size
and type could damage the towers.
Boyadjiev:ji So once again they didn’t need intelligence to get
answers they needed for their plan.30
Wolf:l Only one short comment on communications. The flaw-
lessness of the acts of September 11 showed that there had
to be a lot of communication. I don’t know what type; I only
know what has been published. But it is a fact that the enor-
mous surveillance possibilities of the United States, including
the NSA, did not prevent these events. I was thinking about it
and remembered the rules of conspiracy we were taught dur-
ing the struggle of every revolutionary organization. But those
rules are archaic now. In a conspirative organization, every
man knows only what he needs to know, and knows not more
than two other persons involved. Of course we talked about
the use of modern methods of communication by terrorists,
and they certainly use them; but in the organization of Bin
Laden and another similar organizations, the old rules of
conspiracy play a major role, and if Bin Laden or someone
like him was devising a plan from his cave in Afghanistan or
somewhere else, he would not use mobile phones or other
gadgets. He would be aware of the abilities of the NSA and
similar agencies. Perhaps he would send a courier on horse-
back. I think to prevent these terror attacks, human intelli-
gence is needed most of all. You can only protect yourself
and discover the plans if you have an agent inside this con-
spiracy.
Kerr: I think you’re right. It goes back to this question of separa-
tion of intelligence, foreign intelligence from domestic intelli-
gence. NSA cannot collect communications against US citi-
zens in the United States. It is a foreign intelligence collection
organization, so it has serious limitations. I think it is unlikely
that the United States is going to be able to control informa-
tion. The information is out there in so much detail and vol-
ume that there is no way to limit it. The only point I’ll make to
Professor Cosic is that technology to assist the analysts in
interpreting information is valuable. In the September 11
attacks the terrorists were quite effective in denying us infor-
mation and staying below our threshold.
Boyadjiev:ji You are saying that you can’t limit information. But the
world organized to find means to limit pedophile information
on the Internet. Why not to find a way to limit information
about how to construct, let’s say, binary weapons. I know a
website on the Internet where one can find a terrorist hand-
book much better than the Afghan ‘Encyclopedia’ on terror-
ism. You can find a lot of ‘recipes’ for biological weapons,
chemical weapons, buying and selling weapons, and so on.
That’s not limitation of the freedom of information. That is
limitation of the abilities of terrorist groups in the world to find
recipes on the Internet to enable them to kill Americans or
Europeans or somebody else.31
Cosic:i Yes, there is clearly a lot of information out there. The
problem is very simple. We didn’t recognize the information.
We have to have techniques capable of extracting knowledge
from this information, because if you have billions of pieces
of information, there is no result without proper processing. It
can only cause confusion. But analytical experts will be able
to extract the information and prepare suggestions for the
decision makers.
Lange: We must not be under the illusion that we can eradicate
all this sort of information from the Internet because then you
have to burn your books, and prohibit people from studying
certain things, and where does it all end? On the intelli-
gence-counterintelligence end, I would be interested in your
opinion on whether the September 11 was a group operating
autonomously. Was it guided by another organization, is
there another movement behind it? If there is a State
involved, then we would use one type of intelligence-coun-
terintelligence, and for a professional group, we would use
another. We also can’t rule out the commercial aspect.
Commercial terrorism might develop further. But was it just a
group on its own looking for an organization, which got
together and did the action? I don’t believe that, quite frankly.
I would be very much interested in your opinion because what
sort of intelligence- counterintelligence we will have in the
future depends on it.
Kerr: There are grievances against the US. In the case of
September 11 , it may have been a grievance against the
developed world and globalization, and the United States is
the foremost representative of that group. So it is a logical
target if you have that set of grievances. It seems to me that
it grew from the period following the Afghan war with people
who were trained in Afghanistan primarily to fight against the
Russians following the invasion in 1979, people who came to
the assistance of the Afghans and made connections which
continued when they returned to their home countires. But I
think it goes back to Markus’s point that these are small
groups operating semi- independently, but with connections
to the center. They committed an independent action, but
were part of a greater plan. When you dissect it, it isn’t that
sophisticated a plan, it didn’t involve that many people, it did-
n’t cost that much money, but it required a single objective
and coordination of a lot of different people. When you look
at the actual things that had to be done and the number of
people involved, if there were more than 150 people
involved, I would be surprised. If there were more than a cou-
ple of million dollars involved, I would be surprised.
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Tuðman: There was an analysis in the New York Times, accord-
ing to which the schooling and training of those pilots cost no
more than 200-300,000 dollars.
Kerr: No, but you need other money; you have to rent places, you
have to rent cars, you have to live, you have to pay people to
help you. And there’s also infrastructure. It is not millions and
millions of dollars. 
Lange: I’m just trying to figure out how the recruitment was done.
How did the group constitute itself? How was the coordina-
tion organized?
And the guys from Hamburg. There’s one thing that still rais-
es some questions. What about this strange visit by Atta to
Prague and their alleged meeting? Maybe it was nothing.
Kerr: I haven’t had direct experience in this event, but I have con-
siderable experience in figuring out who was involved in the
bombing of the Pan Am aircraft. I followed the analysis of
how we tracked that problem and it’s a very complex set of
connections. Not unlike the connections in the Bin Laden
group. When we first started, our first reaction was that we
were led down a path initially to the wrong group of people.
It wasn’t that they were innocent people, because they were
also planning attacks against aircraft, it’s just that they didn’t
plan the attack against this aircraft. So as we followed these
people, we eventually came to a dead end. We then got on
the track of the Libyans, primarily thanks to an agent. But a
connection between those cells is not unlikely. These are peo-
ple who knew each other or who had family connections or
political connections. It resembled a network that you would
draw from friends and acquaintances around the world. I
think the Bin Laden network is very much like that.
Smith:i A great many contacts and connections were made in
Afghanistan during and after the war. These people had
known each other, and had assembled to fight the infidel, in
this case the Russians, and after that war some of them stayed
there. The war gave them a chance to establish connections,
people from the Islamic Jihad, Egyptian terrorist groups, and
so on. Terrorist groups and Islamic terrorist groups came and
got to know each other, and then we were surprised to dis-
cover that the Islamic Jihad had branches in about 30 coun-
tries around the world. We discovered this in the mid 1990s.
It was all the result of the friendships, acquaintances, and
connections they made as a result of the Afghanistan fighting.
This is the result. Bin Laden went there, raised money, got
interested in fighting, and then turned very anti-American dur-
ing the Gulf War when we moved troops into Saudi Arabia.
His first aim was to overthrow his own government because
the Saudi government had permitted US troops to be sta-33
tioned on sacred Saudi soil. It’s relatively easy for Bin Laden
and other terrorist leaders to recruit among the Muslims who
had fought in Afghanistan, and that’s what they did. The
result was that a large terrorist network was established. It
would simplify things if it develops that Iraq was involved in
the attack on the World Trade Center, but I’m not sure it is.
The meeting that the terrorist Atta had in Prague with an Iraqi
intelligence officer doesn’t necessarily mean that Iraq was
involved in the attack. Atta might have been trying to get
some support from Iraq; or maybe he was an Iraqi agent. It
is conceivable that the Iraqis would like to know what Bin
Laden was doing. My own guess is that there was no state
sponsor. 
Lange: Then you would say you can explain the workings of this
group just by analyzing the group, and that you don’t need to
find any missing link, be it a state or commercial group,
which recruited people who did not know what they were
really being recruited for.
Smith:i We don’t know much about it. We know enough that we
can be confident it is what we are saying it is. It’s a group of
people that is very anti-Western, anti-Christian, [anti-infidel]
and their hatred was transferred from the Russian side to the
American. That’s why they attacked.
Dedijer:ij I want to say one thing. The Americans made a survey in
Israel as to how many Israelis support an independent
Palestine. It was 60%. 19% voted for war against Palestine.
Now I suggest that an American firm go to the Palestinians
and ask how many of them would give their lives to ensure
Palestine’s existence. I’ll think you’ll find 10,000 among the
millions of Palestinians who would be willing. That is how
these 19 – 20% were recruited. They are willing to give their
lives. I think it is important to change that mentality.
Ferš: I never heard that Bin Laden took responsibility for anything
that happened on September 11 or before.
Kerr: I don’t think he has.
Smith: i He came very close, I think, a couple of weeks ago.
Ferš: He never said it was his organization, or that he was respon-
sible. He spoke only generally. We are against, we fight
against… and so on.
Kerr: That’s unique; no one took credit for the Pan Am bombing,
either. Yet generally people understood what the reason for it
was, even if nobody claimed credit for it.
Ferš: Yes, but what is this new phenomenon? Before we had ter-
rorist organizations who said ‘OK we are responsible for this
and we are fighting for this and that.’ Here we don’t know
what the target is or the object of the attack. 
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Kerr: Do you think there is any doubt, though, in the minds of the
Arab and Islamic world about the source? Do you think there
is any doubt as to what the object was, regardless of who did
it? It seems to me that goes without saying. We may want evi-
dence, but it seems to me the general population knows why
it was done and believes they know who did it.
Ferš: Yes. But, for instance before when a terrorist group hijacked
a plane or something, they wanted to have some leader
released from prison or something like that. Or else
announced what they were fighting for. But now they just act
without announcing anything or raising any issues. 
Kerr: But doesn’t that go back again to what we were talking
about at the beginning?
Ferš: I think it is important to have clear intelligence information
about how and what they are planning.
Tuðman: It is not always clear who is behind certain activities. I
am not talking about terrorist activities in the States because
I don’t know anything about that. This afternoon I will give
some examples of terrorist activities in my country and who
was accused publicly of them. They were terrorist operations
organized in support of Serbian information warfare against
the Croatian government. And it took time to collect clear
evidence against the terrorists and people who instigated the
information warfare. That is why obtaining intelligence about
terrorists and their objectives is very important.
Lange: I would like to link up here and ask the American col-
leagues: Is there really hard evidence that the embassy
bombings were executed by Al-Qaeda? Why not keep an eye
on other organizations? I could think of two dozen organiza-
tions who would like to have done the September 11 action,
could have done it, and maybe have done it. Why Al-
Qaeda?
Smith:i We were able to identify some of the operatives and we
know that they are Al-Qaeda
Lange: But you know there are overlapping loyalties. The same
person can serve in 3 – 4 different organizations.
Kerr: I think you’re asking an important question. First of all, I
don’t know enough about the details of the investigations to
be specific about it, but you do have to distinguish between
intelligence and the knowledge needed to actually prosecute
in a court of law. There is a distinction between those two
kinds of knowledge. But I think everyone is reasonably confi-
dent that it was involved. Could you prove that in a court of
law? Actually, there was a formal case presented by the
Attorney General in the case of the Embassy, so at least from
that perspective they believe they had a case that would stand
up in a court of law. 35
Lange: You are more of an expert than I.  We have to be skepti-
cal of so-called intelligence. I’ll just mention one case, the
so-called chemical weapons factory in Sudan, the attempt to
make it look like more than it was. There are many such
cases, as you well know. But there was no direct need for Bin
Laden to be involved from Afghanistan in the operation. As
you said, it was not that complicated or expensive.
Kerr: I would be very cautious about saying what you just said.
There are many cases. Even the pharmaceutical plan had an
evidentiary base, however flimsy. There was information that
people made judgments on that led the policy makers to con-
clude there was a connection. How good that was is debat-
able, but you act on information that is not firm for a variety
of reasons, some of them very good.
Section II
Old means for new tasks: 
Humint and Covert Operations.
Merging police intelligence and 
national intelligence
Smith:i Old means for new tasks. I would like to talk a little bit
about HUMINT. It was unfortunate that we didn’t have the
kind of intelligence that would have enabled us to forestall
the attack on the World Trade Center, but we didn’t. The
immediate task for all the intelligence services is to do their
best to build their capability to penetrate terrorist organiza-
tions. First, start by identifying the terrorist organizations and
second, identify persons, or a person either in or close to that
terrorist organization so that they, or he, can get information
on it. The only way you can protect yourself against terrorist
organizations is having information. It’s very hard to get
because the people in terrorist organizations, as you know,
are not very nice people, and are very hard to deal with. They
would shun contact with, or kill, most people sitting around
this table. Certainly the Bin Laden group wouldn’t have any-
thing to do with any of us, so you have to find intermediaries
to do it for you. Something, for example, like the Pakistan
Intelligence Service. You need lots of help from the liaison.
They have to work very closely together. Intelligence services
have done a remarkably good job with sharing intelligence
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on the World Trade Center attack. This is unusual, but it’s
going to become more and more routine, because without a
global intelligence network these kinds of attacks will not be
stopped. Unless you have world coverage, world services
working together, you won’t be able to deny the terrorists a
place to operate, a safe haven. They need safe havens. They
function only with great difficulty without a safe haven, it
makes it much more difficult for them to operate. If we have
active and effective intelligence and internal security services
worldwide, the problem will start to go away. It will never go
away entirely, but its threat will be greatly diminished. I was
talking with General Wolf this morning about these problems,
because he is one of the 20th century geniuses on human
intelligence. I asked him if he would give his views about how
to improve HUMINT on terrorist organizations and then I
would like to ask Drago Ferš and our moderator the same
question. You have all been chiefs of service and you have all
had experience in doing this kind of thing. I think the number
one issue facing intelligence services now is how to get bet-
ter at recruiting HUMINT sources. A HUMINT service is the
most effective weapon against terrorism.. Could you,
General Wolf, comment on how you would go about improv-
ing human intelligence on terrorist targets?
Wolf:l You know I have been out of the service for 15 years. Of
course, I have no right to speak about the reasons for the fail-
ure of the services to protect this important part of the United
States. You said the most important thing, and I repeat: with-
out information from inside the conspiracy, it would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent a repetition of those ter-
rible events. I can say again what I said this morning. The
services need a strategy, and if I were to share my personal
experiences from Germany about the struggle between East
and West, I would say we concentrated our efforts on specif-
ic aims. It was not easy to protect my strategy. I think one of
the main problems is to define the objects against which the
services have to work; to concentrate efforts on gaining
human sources. 
Certainly now, after analyzing the events of September 11, it
is possible to stop Bin Laden and his organization, but what
about the others? What about Hamas, Jihad and others in
the Muslim world? They are not alone, and they can certain-
ly count on - if Stevan is right - the poorest and least free peo-
ple as a constant reservoir of terrorism. Americans of course
know better than I what happened in Latin America. It is not
my business to propose the objects against which you should
concentrate the most effort. Of course what happens inside a
nation is different, and the activities of organizations such as37
ETA or IRA are mainly a national problem. National services
have to think about that and concentrate their efforts on it;
nevertheless, it’s necessary to follow the international con-
nections between different terrorist organizations and those
specific national organizations as well. We talked about that
in the morning, and the next problem would be rules of com-
munication. Todor talked about the finances, and that’s a
central question. I’m sure based on the analyses there will be
a determination about what finances are needed to surveill
the various organizations, and locate human-intelligence
possibilities. Terrorist activities can only be prevented if serv-
ices focus on their raison d’etre. Maybe a re-allocation of
personal and material funds and radical new commitments
should be considered. I assume the U.S. services will use the
immense financial support given by the President of the
United States to create some balance between the the
amount of funding for technology and for HUMINT. One les-
son to be learned from September 11 is that the scale, meth-
ods, and professionalism of those terrible attacks call for a
redefining of priorities. Above all, in my opinion, it is neces-
sary to increase the use of human intelligence. 
Cosic:i The title of this session is ‘old means for new tasks.’ I
would like to talk more about new means. New means for old
tasks for new challenges might be a good definition of this
session. In that sense, the question is: What are the new
means? I will cite a report published a couple of weeks ago
by the Pentagon. The Pentagon issued a rush request for
ideas and technologies for fighting terrorism, exotic new sur-
veillance technologies that could be used against distant ene-
mies as well as at American airports, shopping malls, etc. The
Pentagon bypassed its own bureaucracy, requesting that pro-
posals be submitted by December 27 so that products and
projects could be in place in 12 to 18 months. This is a great
opportunity for people in the high-tech business. They
requested items such as computer systems for tracking those
who purchase bomb-making materials, portable polygraph
machines for questioning airline passengers, print software
for automatically recognizing people speaking Middle East
languages, and digital systems to more quickly recognize
threats. So it is clear that part of the future budgeting is shift-
ing from heavy jet fighters to the struggle against this type of
warfare. Sophisticated tools for identifying people who have
handled weapons of mass destruction, use of digital finger-
prints by law enforcement, and faster identification of finger-
prints. This means all potential technologies can improve the
tracking of the people and the movements of terrorist groups.
I fully agree that human intelligence should be most impor-38
tant, but the tools and technologies human intelligence has
at its disposal are also very important. Additional funds can
improve our potential. This is one aspect, the impact of tech-
nology. The other aspect is understanding society, what’s
going on in society today? A lot of research is being done on
behavior modeling using techniques such as agent base
modeling, which focus on social influences and cultural
dynamics. This research helps us to better predict the behav-
ior of terrorists in the future; in the past we were unable to do
this. The theory of homogenous culture has definitely disap-
peared since it showed we were not, in fact, moving toward
a common system of values, a common culture. My favorite
topic, though, is related to the transition in our society. The
transition to democracy creates potential threats. Why? Many
states have been unable to manage the transition to democ-
racy and a market economy successfully in a globalized
world, where values have been imposed on us by the most
successful economic power. Many states will fail in the
process of globalization, so we have to be aware that with
globalization we also have fragmentation. We should oppose
the imposition of values upon states without the agreement of
the states participating in the globalization process; other-
wise, great frustration and insecurity will result . In short, we
need more creativity and imagination to predict what was
earlier unpredictable. Especially in a high-tech war. High-tech
war means war without a single dead soldier on one side and
all the casualties on the other side. This can lead to a deci-
sion, for example, to activate biological and nuclear
weapons. 
Tuðman: I also wanted to talk about new means for old tasks, but
from an historical perspective. I want to point out that it’s not
only Americans who have problems with terrorism and terror-
ist activities; so do other countries. I would like to give some
examples of Serbian terrorist activities in Croatia in the
1990s, data which are now more or less declassified and
open, but not that well-known by the public. I think they illus-
trate the legal and ethical dimension of terrorism. 
At the end of the 1980s, and especially after 1985 when it
was clear that the communist system and the future of
Yugoslavia was danger of disintegrating, Belgrade developed
a parallel intelligence system under the control of communist
hard-liners. Due to a lack of trust between Yugoslav and
republic services, the parallel system was organized from
Belgrade, and in Croatia located and run from the head-
quarters of the Central Committee of the Croatian
Communist Party in Zagreb. Slavko Malobabic, who was for-
mal counselor and/or Chief of staff of several presidents of39
the Croatian Communist Party between 1985-1990, was
running at the same time a parallel intelligence center under
the cover and sponsorship of the Communist Party. The serv-
ice was formally organized as an analytical group working in
the Central Committee. But it had official sources in Yugoslav
military and Croatian civilian intelligence services. The ana-
lytical group had access to the intelligence products of exist-
ing services, and all citizens’ dossiers from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. The group was preocupied with collecting all
intelligence and personal data, and planning special opera-
tions and information warfare against ‘internal enemies’.
They had a budget, documentation, access to the documen-
tation of other services, and a network of journalists to dis-
seminate their ‘analytical products’. That was the situation up
until May, 1990, when the first democratic elections were
held in Croatia. At that moment, the group and documenta-
tion were moved to the Military Counterintelligence
Headquarters (KOS) in Zagreb. The same people continued
planning operations now under the sponsorship of the
Military Counterintelligence Service of the Yugoslav Army. The
group organized number of terrorist activities in Croatia, and
I will relate a few of them. 
During the short war in Slovenia they planned and mined the
power-transmission lines as revenge for the siege of the mili-
tary barracks in Slovenia. On August 19, 1991, a bomb was
planted in the Jewish municipality building in Zagreb at
4.15am. Ten minutes later, another bomb exploded in the
Jewish graveyard. The man arrested and found responsible
was Serbian and an agent of the Military Counterintelligence
Service, working in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Zagreb.
After he planted those two bombs, he moved to Bosnia and
was one of the organizers of Republic Srpska. 
Another example is the rocket attack on the presidential resi-
dence on October 7, 1991. The presidential residence was
hit with rockets during a meeting between Croatian President
Franjo Tuðman, Stipe Mesic, President of Yugoslavia at that
time, and Ante Markovic, President of the Federal
Government. Nobody was killed inside the residence, but the
residence was destroyed. Today, the names of the perpetra-
tors are known. The pilot of the MIG was Ivan Dopuða, and
the navigator Èedomir Kneževic, the head of counterintelli-
gence in the Air Force. All the necessary intelligence data
were obtained from Slavko Malobabic, who had been oper-
ating the parallel intelligence center from 1985-1990. 
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The Zagreb group was forced to leave Croatia in the summer
of 1990. because some of their members were arrested and
prosecuted. The group was relocated to Belgrade, and as a
part of the military counterintelligence service continued the
same activities, but under a new name. The code name for
the new operation was ‘Opera’. The objectives of ‘Opera’
were to organize information warfare and covert operations,
and to arm paramilitary units engaged in Serbian aggression
on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just to give you
some examples of their activities: the military counterintelli-
gence service (KOS) gave approval for all the official state-
ments of the JNA (Yugoslav Army). KOS also controlled press
conferences and all press releases. ‘Opera’ produced and
prepared video information to combat reports of JNA aggres-
sion, first on Vukovar, and then in Dubrovnik, where they pro-
vided their interpretation of aggression on Dubrovnik. The
point is that the first information about aggression on Croatia
and the atrocities by the JNA were prepared by KOS – the
JNA counter-intelligence service. ‘Opera’ was responsible for
fabrication of information from the Military Medical Academy
in Belgrade as well. The objective was to produce disinfor-
mation and then blame others for the atrocities. The infor-
mation, misinformation, and disinformation products were
distributed to the international press center in Belgrade. KOS
and their agents were very successful. Even today, some of
their disinformation are still cited in the former Yugoslavia
and European media. 
For example, Jane’s Intelligence published in 1994 an article
about the Croatian Intelligence Service.  We know today that
the author of the article was close to an individual in the per-
son Serbian service. And several years ago there was an
affair in the British media connecting that same person with a
member of British Parliament. But the article in 1994 offered
a negative picture of the Croatian service and myself. The
main thesis of the article was that the Croatian service is
under the control of the German service. At that time we did-
n’t even have a relationship with the German service. But the
main message and context was the ‘Nazi’ background of
both the services. 
‘Opera’ was organized to spin Serbian aggression, and the
atrocities and terrorist activities committed.  ‘Opera’ thus pro-
moted messages and disinformation such as: Herzegovinians
are fighting for Croatia while people from Zagreb are skiing
in Austria; the leaders of HDZ are former agents of the
Yugoslav Military Counterintelligence Service (KOS), etc. 
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Operations run by (KOS) can be rightfully described as ter-
rorist activities. The objective of the ‘Proboj’ (Break through)
operation was to plan acts of aggression and arm the Serbian
population in Croatia and Bosnia (before the conflict had
evenstarted). Just to illustrate, all the key actors in the Serbian
aggression on Croatia were KOS agents: Milan Martic,
Goran Hadžic, and Milan Babic. 
A Yugoslav MIG caused a UN helicopter to crash in January
1992, near Podrute, and several EU monitors were killed.
General Bajic gave the command for the operation and the
MIG took off from the Bihac airport. The operation was coor-
dinated by the Yugoslav Military Counterintelligence service.
Kerr: I don’t disagree at all with what has been said about the
need for human intelligence and the nature of that problem.
But it seems to me there are some other things worth address-
ing. Some of the restrictions, certainly in the United States, on
activities that the government imposed on itself are going to
change. For instance, intervention in financial transactions.
There has been a reluctance in the United States to take
action electronically by attacking financial accounts because
of the concern about the disruption of financial institutions
and intervention in global financial systems. But I think we’re
going to find that people are a little inclined with the appro-
priate authority to go after people’s financial accounts elec-
tronically. There also is a real likelihood that in the United
States, especially against non-US citizens, there is going to be
more intrusive surveillance, whether it’s electronic, telephon-
ic or other. I think the ground rules for our intelligence
involvement in activities it tended to stay away from in the
past or be very careful about are going to change. That has
some serious long term implications for legal and civil rights.
On the other hand, it seems to me that those very capabili-
ties also give opportunities to people for a different kind of
terrorism. There will be opportunities for disruption of normal
business activity, changing or bringing down stock markets,
or affecting normal business transactions. The ability to cre-
ate havoc in the financial system is very real.
Dedijer:ij Like what Soros did in Tyron.
Kerr: There are all kinds of things. Opportunities for disinforma-
tion are very great. Stevan mentions in his paper that there
was a panic in the United States in part because people did
not understand the reason for the attacks. They did not think
the US was at war. 
Wolf:l Speaking about targets and priorities, we only mentioned in
passing the question of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and the possibility of uncontrolled production. I
think after the events of September 11, this should be a high42
priority. We must prevent access to them by terrorists, and
maintain very close, strict control over them. The first step is
to analyze where and who, and to establish priorities about
how to manage this problem.
Lacoste:This subject is for me a very important one; as you know,
I have not been in charge of secret affairs in my country since
1985, more than sixteen years. However, I still have a great
interest in intelligence and security matters. I am teaching in
a French university and writing articles and books on these
subjects. Last June, I published a book with one of my friends,
Secret Services and Geopolitics. Among other issues, we
argue that in the present world, previous distinctions between
foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence are much less
relevant. The September 11th attacks in the US are an exam-
ple of the new complexity of intelligence problems after the
end of the Cold War and the opening of most state borders.
For several years I have been studying that specific aspect,
and I believe that just because we have new tasks, we do not
have to discard old methods. We cannot get rid of the tradi-
tional ‘HUMINT’ because of the remarkable performances of
the new SIGINT and other scientific systems now at the dis-
posal of intelligence services. We have to keep in mind basic
stratetic principles, and classical knowledge about war and
law and order enforcement. Military and police affairs have
many points in common; both are fighting enemies or adver-
saries, and in both cases, you have to reveal and understand
the intentions, capabilities, behavior, and logistical problems
of your ‘enemy’. It has always been the job of intelligence
services to address those questions. When police officers are
fighting against gangsters, it takes another form, but it is not
much different than when the military fights its enemy on the
battlefield. 
In my country we have dealt for many years with various
forms of terrorism. I remember during the Second World War,
when I was young and the victorious German army was rul-
ing my country, we were working to build and operate ‘resist-
ance’ networks to help our Anglo-Saxon allies in their fight
for victory. But the German authorities considered members
of those networks ‘terrorists’; for the allies they were ‘free-
dom fighters’. You could say that when the Communist party
ordered a German officer killed in the Paris Metro in 1941,
it was an act of provocation intended to ‘radicalize’ the situ-
ation. Nowadays, we see similar situations between Tsahal,
the Israeli Army, and the Palestinian ‘intifada’ fighters. 
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Many years later in the 1970s, when I was in charge of the
Prime Minister’s office, we had to deal with ‘Basque’ terror-
ism. At that time, a conservative government was in power in
France, and if our President had openly assisted the Spanish
authorities in their struggle against the Spanish Basque ter-
rorists who were ‘political refugees’ in our country, he would
have been fiercely attacked by the ‘French left’ parties.
However, a few years later there was a political change in
France and Spain, making it easier for President Mitterand to
cooperate with the Spanish police than it had been for
President Giscard d’Estaing to work with Franco’s police and
justice system.
International cooperation against terrorism is politically diffi-
cult, even bilaterally. It is not only a question of good rela-
tions between intelligence and police systems; it is also nec-
essary for judges to work hand in hand, which raises the
problem of compatibility between two justice systems and
procedures. When you arrest a terrorist in one country, that
country’s laws and procedures apply. The professional terror-
ists take advantage of the differences in procedures, and
know how to profit from their ‘ civil rights’ in order to escape
prosecution .
I had another experience with the Italian ‘Red Brigades’ in the
early 1980’s. The Italian government and judges were very
concerned about the political violence that had led to so
many murders and terrorist actions in the 1970s. They knew
some of the Red Brigades leaders were living in France as
‘political refugees’. But President Mitterand and his socialist
friends were convinced that those people were being pun-
ished for their political opinions, not for having committed
crimes, and opposed all extradition requests from Italy. Today
we have similar problems between Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and
the US government, in regard to financial aspects of Islamic
terrorism, money laundering, and so on.
We also had the case of terrorism in North Ireland, where the
British have been fighting for many years against the IRA. In
Germany, they had the ‘ Red Army Faction’. Through this, the
European governments learned to improve cooperation
between national services. You have heard of the
‘Schengeningen agreements.’ It demonstrates how difficult it
is to achieve collaboration between different countries. It is
possible to cooperate efficiently when different entities work
within the same ‘ task force’ on a common task for a limited
period of time. It is easier than creating permanent organiza-
tions or modifying laws through national Parliaments. 
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Dedijer:ij The Middle East policy of the United States is changing.
Suddenly President Bush says Palestinian has to be independ-
ent, and then Colin Powell and Shimon Peres, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, say the same thing. Shimon Peres, who
should be in The Hague himself for what he did to the
refugees in 1978. I have a copy of a speech Powell delivered
on November 21 in Kentucky, in which he says that the vision
of the United States is to have a conference in the Middle East
out of which will come two States, Palestinian and Israeli,
both secure and with firm borders, both working to improve
the lives of their people. If this policy is followed by the United
States, I think we can solve the problem of Arab terrorism. If
Bush follows the policy of giving the Palestinians independ-
ence, the main threat of terrorism will disappear. We have a
lot of political experience; let’s think how this problem can be
solved. We have to treat Israel like any other country, like
Macedonia, Croatia, or Serbia, no special privileges. That’s
the only way to solve the problem. Then Arab terrorism is
going to disappear, because you’ll disarm people. They’ll
say: ‘I’ve got country, Palestine. I can live in it, I can go to
school in it, and I’m not terrorized by anybody. That is why I
think the American policy of declaring war on Bin Laden is
ridiculous. How many Afghans have been killed so far? OK,
4500 people were lost in New York and the Pentagon. How
many Afghanshave died so far?  It’s a pure eye for an eye
policy being followe by the United States, but at the same
time the idea of independence for Palestine is being promot-
ed to rout this kind of terrorism. 
Kerr: The US has tried to solve this problem. A great deal of ener-
gy, time, emotion, money, investment, and even a good deal
of Presidential prestige has been put into the solution. But I
would also argue that solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem
will not solve all the problems the Arab world has with the US.
Bin Laden’s hatred of the US and a good deal of the Arab
hostility toward the US is not necessarily because of the
Palestinian problem. It’s also the forward presence of the
United States in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle
East which is seen as an intrusive foreign presence in an area
that they presume is their area of dominance. You quote
Susan Sontag, who I think is an idiot. Her argument about the
September 11 event is like telling the wife of someone whose
husband has been shot in a robbery that if she understood
the motives of the killer, she would have more sympathy for
the killers. I find that a very illogical and fallacious argument.
Dedijer:ij But look, this is the first time you have been at war in your
own country. But we’ve experienced all kinds of wars.
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Smith:i But we are going to work to prevent it from ever happen-
ing again. We don’t sit there and say ‘I wonder why they did
that?’ There are some people, a very small segment of the
population, who said ‘I wonder why they did that, let’s study
and see why they did that’. That is a foolish reaction. It’s
crazy. When someone hits you, you hit him back. You don’t
say ‘I wonder why they did that.’ Maybe after you beat them,
you say it. But in this case, the first duty of the president is to
defend his country, and when you’re attacked, you attack
back, you defend, you find the person that did it, and you get
them. That is what we are doing. This is a very rational reac-
tion from Bush.
Ferš: You said in the beginning that the only way to protect our-
selves is to have the information. I agree. What will happen
after September 11 is a new challenge, as you mentioned
earlier. There are different ways of gathering information.
During my career I didn’t have these different means at my
disposal, because when I started out in Slovenia, we didn’t
have the technical equipment; we started from scratch and
had only human resources. I am sure my American col-
leagues could push a button and have half of Afghanistan
and the world on the screen. If I want to see this, I have to get
on the Internet. But ten years ago we didn’t have the Internet,
we didn’t have anything, we had to find human resources to
engage. How much energy needs to be expended for people
to understand why the former Yugoslavia collapsed? Who in
1989-1990 and later understood what former Yugoslavia’s
real problems were? A very small group of people. Maybe
they didn’t have information or inaccurate information. I am
sure people abroad had all the information they needed, but
they didn’t understand the situation because they didn’t
understand the issues. How could you understand the events
that Miro mentioned earlier in Zagreb and in Croatia. It was
very hard. Also my experience fighting the Yugoslav Army in
1991 showed that we couldn’t finish our job using only tech-
nical equipment; we needed human resources. But without
without technical support, we also wouldn’t have been able
to do anything. A combination of both is the optimal way to
perform a HUMINT covert operation. Each case is unique, in
each area we have a different situation, and each case must
be prepared using several different actions and reactions. We
heard earlier that the Mujahedeen and the Afghans are poor
people and have nothing but their lives to give. But those who
organized these criminal acts are still alive and will be alive
in the future. They will not give their lives for a concrete
action. That is a different issue.
46
Smith:i Their belief, their grievance, is that Islam, which was once
the great civilization, has fallen behind the upstart, infidel,
and corrupt West. They are angry and terribly resentful.
Ferš: I think the real question is: How much power are we pre-
pared to give to the ones fighting against the terrorists? I
agree that if you have a big problem, you ask the
Government to allow new measures to be introduced. But are
there any governments anywhere prepared to open the door
and say: ‘OK, services, you now have a new measure, so you
can do what you want because in Europe and Washington,
three buildings collapsed and a lot of people were killed.
Smith:i I think even now if we press the Europeans and ask them
for help, engage and work with them, I think their govern-
ments will help. I think they’re all concerned. European gov-
ernments realize that this can happen anywhere, because the
more developed the world, the better the targets, the easier
they are to hit. The big targets are in the United States,
Europe, and certain countries in Asia, and if we have decent
liaison relationships with services, those services will be
responsive to our arguments that they have to do something.
We can’t do it all ourselves, and that is why it is so important
to have close, continuous, and harmonious liaison relations.
Lange: I would like to comment on Mr. Dedijer’s remarks. I agree
with him, but only 50%. We must clearly differentiate between
two types of terrorists. There are the guys walking out of the
camps with bags of dynamite, and underprivileged and frus-
trated people linking themselves up with the Israeli or
American policy in the Middle East, but the people who
enacted the September 11 attack are a different breed. If you
look at their biographies, you will find they have above aver-
age qualifications, are very introverted and rational, not very
socially integrated, but not unpleasant people. They’re not
the lunatic fringe type, and this makes human intelligence a
very different task, because it’s difficult to infiltrate the groups,
develop a pattern, and search for these people. This is a task
that cannot be solved by individual psychology. What we
need is to approach it as an organizational problem and
develop search patterns for certain types of organizations,
money flow, and so on; forget about psychology, because
that takes us nowhere. There’s a big difference between sui-
cide bombers wearing dynamite belts and the WTC pilots.
Dedijer:ij You said you agree with me 50%. I’ve been in this field
for 30 years, and since the 1970s, I’ve been saying that spy-
ing is dying out. I also published a lot of articles saying that
spying was not necessary, and that it’s just a way to get infor-
mation. Now that is supported by others. You can find every-
thing on the Internet. But human intelligence is extremely47
important. We have here the man who made better use of it
than anybody else. Used it to penetrate the entire German
government. Lord Johnson is a very respected writer on intel-
ligence and he says now that human intelligence and espi-
onage were Cold War techniques which are no longer use-
ful. I think that’s wrong. Because if the FBI, CIA, and 13
agencies were clever enough to have had one Bin Laden,
they would have shot down those planes before they struck.
That means you didn’t have the knowledge to find these peo-
ple. Technical intelligence can’t supplant human intelligence.
Most terrorist groups are working conspiratively, using the
skill of keeping their mouths shut and knowing how to keep
secrets, not giving out information, and so forth. What will
human intelligence and espionage consist of in the future,
what’s terrorism and what is not terrorism?
Wolf:l Let me say just one word. I am absolutely sure that there is
no group or organization that cannot be infiltrated. To use an
example, though this was long ago: the Chancellor’s office in
Germany, where it was almost impossible to recruit agents.
But it was possible to infiltrate that office by using a long-term
strategy, by choosing the right people. It is hard for me to
understand why the services did not have sources in the Al-
Qaeda organization.
Kerr: I wouldn’t assume they had no sources. They had no
sources on this operation but they had a number of sources.
It is true on this operation they did not have good enough
sources.
Boyadjiev:ji I want to ask something. First of all, do we agree that
terrorism is not a war between Islam and Christianity? I think
this is one of the aims of Al-Qaeda, to show it as confronta-
tion between religions. Are we going to agree that it’s not a
war between civilizations? If we agree - because terrorism
doesn’t have anything to do with civilization - then I agree
with General Wolf. If it’s not a religious or civilizational con-
flict, then we have a common denominator with people from
other religions. We have common ground to fight a common
evil, terrorism. Because it’s working against Islam, it’s work-
ing against Christianity, it’s working against humanity and
civilization. 
I can give the example of the Branch Davidian sect in the
States - a Christian sect that committed mass suicide which
can also be characterized as mass murder. Let’s agree on two
major things. It’s not a religious war, it’s not Islam against
Christianity, and it’s not one civilization against another. I
think if we accept that position, then one of the main aims for
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the intelligence people and HUMINT operatives is to locate
sources in the Islamic world ready to cooperate and help fight
terrorism. They will then more easily understand that terrorists
are radicals working against Islam and Islam interests.
Smith:i But this is about Christianity; it’s in the minds of the peo-
ple who attacked the World Trade Center. Bin Laden. It’s a
fight against Christianity. We’re the infidels, but we should not
present it that way. We should not say yes, it is. Bush has been
good at this. He has been trying to isolate the extremists in
the Islamic world by being careful to say nothing critical
about Islam and to describe the terrorists as persons who
have gone against the teachings of Islam. He has tried to
make it clear to the Islamic world that it is not Christianity ver-
sus Islam. He realizes that it is important to frame the issue as
the terrorists being against both Islam and Christianity. We
want to isolate the terrorists and we do that by not saying it is
Christianity against Islam.
Kerr: There is fundamental tension between the Islamic and west-
ern worlds. Islam has not changed since the 8th century, while
the Christian world has gone through several reformations
and changes necessary to adapt to a changing world. To say
that there is no difference and that there is no conflict there is
to ignore a very important issue. I don’t agree with
Huntington that conflict is inevitable. But I think there is a very
important schism that needs to be healed.
Boyadjiev:ji But this is not the basis for a general confrontation.
This is a difference that ought to be overcome but it should
not become a basis for confrontation. Otherwise, we all lose.
Smith:i I think we’re talking about two different things. Our tactics
should be to not say that there is a clash between the West
and the East, between Christianity and Islam, because that
would be very counterproductive. We have singled out the
terrorists and distinguished them from the vast majority in the
Muslin world who are moderate and non-violent.
Luèic:i I want to again refer to terms, definitions, and names. Are
you aware of any terrorist organization having the word
Christianity in its name? There are Western terrorist organi-
sations such as ETA, IRA, etc., but they are fighting for their
national interests, not for Christianity! So I would use the term
western world, not Christianity. On the other hand, the major-
ity of terrorist organisations from the Islamic world include
Islam in the organization name, and in their agendas they
clearly state that they are fighting for Islam and Allah. This
form of terrorism is becoming stronger and growing in num-
bers, and we can define it as ‘green socialism’. 
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Kerr: There are some extreme right-wing people in the United
States that are activists willing to kill to support their views.
Some of these are Christians. I don’t think you can find a
movement whose primary objective is Christian domination,
though.
Lacoste: May I make a practical comment? The leaders of radi-
cal Islamic terrorism must find and train recruits. The best way
is to take young, uneducated people, because they are easy
to influence and inculcate with radical ideas. We know what
is happening in the ‘Koran schools’ and the ‘military’ camps
in Afghanistan and Yemen, where future ‘Mujahedeens’ are
being trained. In the Sierra-Leone civil war, teenagers have
been the most ferocious and merciless fighters. 
However, in the September 11 attacks we saw something
new: the arrival of a new generation of terrorists. They are
very clever, well-educated people who have been living for
years in western countries - Germany, France, Great Britain,
Spain, and even in the USA, as ‘normal’ citizens. But they are
also fanatics. It is a strange psychological condition, similar
to that in the so-called ‘religious’ sects, when some appar-
ently sane people fall under the influence of a ‘ guru’, obliv-
ious to the fact that he is a common thief and so on. You
might recall the collective suicides in Guyana, and in
Switzerland a few years ago. 
A third point is that the terrorist groups have a remarkable
ability to impose strong discipline and strict rules of secrecy
on their members. Professional police and Secret Services in
charge of collecting intelligence find it very difficult, and
sometimes impossible, to penetrate terrorist organizations. 
The task of ‘counterintelligence’ is hard because the terrorist
networks apply perfectly all the basic principles. I remember
a specific experience during the civil war in Lebanon, when
we were confronted with clandestine and terrorist organiza-
tions, bombings of our barracks, assassination of our diplo-
mats, and even terrorism on French territory. My Service,
DGSE, succeeding in introducing an agent into one of the
groups which was preparing an action in France. I was then
confronted with the problem of confidentiality vis à vis my col-
leagues in French domestic counterintelligence; if they caught
the man they would deprive us of an important asset. Was it
better to tell them or to keep the secret ? When you are deal-
ing with terrorist networks, it can often be more dangerous
than conventional espionage.
A fourth point is what I call ‘the mafia syndrome’. I believe
the most dangerous criminal organzations are those organ-
ized like the traditional mafias. The mafia system is much
more subtle than ‘ordinary crime’ gangs. Their leaders are50
more clever; they have friends and agents in different parts of
society, and they strictly observe the ‘omerta’, the rule of
silence. Law enforcement forces seldom infiltrate agents into
those organizations; the knowledge we have of the members
and structure was not gained by infiltration operations but
from the revelations of former ‘mafiosi’ who had been threat-
ened by their former compatriots (in Italian, the ‘pentiti’).
When former members of terrorist groups feel remorse for
their crimes and agree to help us eradicate terrorism, we will
have similar successes here.
Dedijer:ij I read a book recently called Fight against God. It is a
book about three kinds of extremists: Christian, Jewish and
Muslim. The author appeared a week ago on CNN. There
are extremists in every religion. In my article you will find a
wonderful scene from the National Cathedral. All the presi-
dents were there, Bush and son, everybody. Then a beautiful
man dressed in red with a little red cap appeared, got up,
and said only this: ‘The Gospel of Matthew says to be mod-
est. Be humble in spirit.’ It was a beautiful lecture to Bush and
the others; take it easy, don’t go crazy. There’s no need to
pass a resolution here. We are all against extremists of any
religion.
Boyadjiev:ji Continuing with what you said, I was working in the
States during the Teheran story, the kidnapping of Americans
at the Embassy. In regard to extremism, I recall a popular
country western song from that time that became very famous
in the States. I liked it, too, but it was a good example of
extremism. I do not recall the name of the singer but he was
singing to the ayatollahs: ‘Let our people go or we’ll turn your
country into a parking lot’. It was very nationalistic with a lot
of extremism. I wouldn’t be surprised if some small group
appears claiming to be the new prophets working for
Christianity and planning terrorist acts against Islam. I do not
think this can be excluded.
Meðimorec:i I would like to raise an important question. In
Croatia, terrorism has been examined from political, eco-
nomical, sociological, cultural, and religious perspectives.
But the arguments are simplistic and the conclusions reached
are always predictable. ‘Black and white’ explanations are
given. The roots are not explored; faults, misconceptions and
erroneous political characterizations (towards countries and
societies inclined toward terrorism) are not analyzed. An intel-
lectual doesn’t dare risk public attack to praise Huntington’s
thesis about the clash of civilizations. It is almost considered
offensive to study the violent streams of Islamic fundamental-
ism, or current Islamic ideas and movements. An intellectual
has to follow the governing school of thought and repeat51
ideas until they become ‘mantras’. The world is based on
multicultural, multireligious, multiracial dogmas, on intercul-
tural understanding and tolerance. But there are religious,
cultural, and historical schisms and tensions. Such differences
are obvious to people living within these schisms; for
instance, the nations along the boundary (the old Roman
lines in former Yugoslavia) which divides the West from the
East. This is a fact that cannot be ignored and must be taken
into account in any serious political analysis. It is not possible
to understand the problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, or Macedonia, and act accordingly if you don’t take
into account differences between the two major religions –
Islam and Christianity. Two philosophies, two cultures, two
civilizations. If you do not understand the depth of the roots
of those two different civilizations, you will not be able to
understand the real nature of terrorism. The Admiral links dif-
ferent kinds of terrorism to different politics. I would like you
to focus on what I call the ‘asymmetrical flow of history’. We
have been observing the process of national liberation and
homogenization in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Ten
years ago, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
went through the same turbulence. These countries are
undergoing a historical process which occurred 150 years
ago in the rest of Europe. The historical framework was not
the same for the nations in the West and those in southeast-
ern Europe. The historical discrepancies are obvious. The
means for achieving a national state, freedom, and liberation
from an oppressing hegemony vary in every country. Is the
Albanian national movement in Kosovo terrorist or is it wag-
ing a legitimate struggle for independence? Is this ‘terrorism’
the same as Al Qaeda’s? Terrorism in one country is not the
same or identical in another. There are many variations and
forms. One should be able to differentiate between the vari-
ous situations, roots, and causes of terrorism. Today, Bin
Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s terrorism is the most dangerous and
obvious, and should be neutralized by all posisble means.
Future conflicts in Somalia, Philippines, Iraq, and Yemen
depend on the outcome of this struggle. Different means and
methods must be devised. In the fight against terrorism, dif-
ferent tools should be used according to individual charac-
teristics. Reformation was mentioned. A few days ago an arti-
cle appeared in The Times dealing with the period of refor-
mation. The author is a professor at York University, and his
thesis is that we should return to the pre-reformation period
in which differences between religions were normal and
acceptable. His idea is that we should accept differences
between Islam and Christianity in their purest form, which52
would enable us to better understand modern tensions
between the two major civilizations. A short remark on
HUMINT. All these technological ‘miracles’ are helpful, but
only intelligence officers on the ground can obtain vital infor-
mation and accurately assess the dangers. In my experience,
cooperation, exchange of data, and joint operations are the
best means to counter terrorism.
Boyadjiev:ji If we do not agree that all forms of terrorism - left,
right, religious, national, minority, majority terrorism are
crimes against humanity, we are going to have double stan-
dards. With double standards we cannot fight any form of ter-
rorism, because there will always be someone supporting
some type of terrorism. Terrorism is a crime against humani-
ty and that ought to be accepted totally, without any differen-
tiation between the different kinds of terrorism. It’s a crime.
Lacoste: I agree. It is different because in addition to terrorist
actions against the USA, it also creates a dangerous threat
for moderate Muslim and Arab states. There is the possiblity
of destabilization of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf
Emirates and so on. It is more a new kind of revolution than
a ‘crusade’ of the Muslim against the Christian world. We
have been confronted for decades with the political revolu-
tions of Marxism and Fascism. Now we have another chal-
lenge, another revolution involving two billion people. We
have to watch this problem very carefully.
Lacoste: I agree it is different, because it is not just a terrorist act
against the USA. It is even more dangerous for many Muslim,
Arab states. It could destabilize Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
and so on. It is not a crusade of the Muslim world against the
Christian world, but a new kind of revolution. We know about
the political revolutions of Marxism, but this is another type of
revolution because it affects more than one or two billion
people. So we have to consider this issue very carefully.
Tuðman: To return to what Boyadjiev said: terrorism is a crime.
Any kind of violence is unacceptable. Any threat against a life
is a crime. What I would like to ask is: do we accept distinc-
tions or not? Do we acknowledge nations’ differences in pol-
itics, cultural identities, society, cultures and interests in the
world? How do we deal with differences we do not like and
that are unacceptable to us because they are conflict with our
interests? That’s the problem. Obviously, history is replete
with the struggles of nations to survive and achieve a better
position in the world. Throughout history, there are periods of
war and periods of peace, when nations or states are able to
achieve better positions without military conflict or loss of life.
Theoretically, it is easy to agree on what constitutes terrorism.
How to evaluate the different types of terrorism is not so easy.53
Some governments or individuals classify certain activities as
terrorist, while others disagree. Are there universal or inter-
national legal criteria or standards on terrorist activity?
Perhaps on a theoretical and philosophical level, but I doubt
something like that can formulated among countries with dif-
ferent political, cultural, economic, and developmental dis-
parities.
Gömbös: I’d like to quote The Economist that terrorism is not only
a religious but a complex, overall problem. ‘The truth is,
America is despised mainly for its success; for the appealing
and, critics would say, corrupting alternative it presents to a
traditional Islamic way of life; and for the humiliation which
many Muslims feel when they consider the comparative fail-
ure, in material terms, of their once-mighty civilization. It
helps Arab governments, no doubt, to blame that failure on
outsiders.’
Wolf:l You asked about Albanian terrorism. I read that during the
time the KLA was preparing for terror attacks, hundreds of
fighters of the ‘holy war’, recruited from different Islamic
countries, came into Albania to plan terrorist activities with
the locals. I don’t intend now to discuss the war in Kosovo,
the KLA, and terror activities, but just wanted to say how dif-
ficult it is to define terrorists and terrorist organizations.
Cosic:i There is no doubt that we need a revolution in intelligence
affairs, but a revolution which will define and design a new
strategy to prevent terrorism and provide a clear vision of
potential terrorist threats! That’s why I have stressed technol-
ogy as a new tool. I agree that the most valuable resource is
human intuition, expertise, and knowledge. But human intel-
ligence failed on September 11th.
Dedijer:ij The theme here is merging police intelligence and
national intelligence. Since 1945, every country has worked
on building up an intelligence community consisting of differ-
ent agencies. The English were the pioneers. They established
the Central Intelligence Board in 1936, which is in Downing
Street 11. And that National Intelligence Board deals with all
intelligence issues, all threats to the British Empire. Then other
countries after the Second World War started developing
intelligence communities for intelligence: security, FBI, police
and so forth. Now the world is changing so rapidly that you
can’t comprehend it, you can’t measure it; still we have to
monitor all these organizations and determine how they func-
tion. Recently I quoted Robert Gates, former head of CIA,
and four Presidents who said that the CIA is the most closed
organization possible, and that they don’t tolerate the any-
one’s opinion but their own. You’ve had intelligence failures;
intelligence failures occur everywhere, but my question con-54
cerns the role of bureaucracy. What is meant by bureaucra-
cy? I think that we have to consider the issue of bureaucrati-
zation of intelligence communities. How did the NY operation
escape the 13 United States intelligence organizations?
Another favorite case of mine is Aldrich Ames. The New York
Times wrote that he was totally incompetent but was nonethe-
less promoted. He lived like a king and nobody saw it or had
the courage to speak out. What happened with Ames applies
to all intelligence organizations. I’m not picking on the United
States. So the question is how to motivate people? During the
Cold War everybody was a hero in intelligence, they were all
007s, and felt proud about it. In ‘Foreign Affairs’ the CIA still
advertises, inviting young people to apply to the CIA. But they
are all bureaucratic organizations; you don’t measure the
output. You don’t know what you get for the money you put
in. How are you going to evaluate what you get from the
money you invest in all this different groups and how can you
coordinate them? I don’t know how bureaucratic Croatian
intelligence is, but I suspect it is at a high level. 
Intelligence is effectiveness, how you use your brain, what
ideas you produce, how you create ideas, and so forth. I
would like to raise the question of how to fight bureaucracy
in the intelligence communities. How can we make them
more efficient, so that they produce measurable results and
do not miss problems or fail to predict events? So I am going
conclude with this, the theme of bureaucracy, bureaucratiza-
tion of intelligence organizations. I think this should be on the
agenda of every community, regardless of specific problems
of intelligence or acts of terrorism act in New York.
I just want to add this. IBM has estimated that business intel-
ligence investment is 70 billion dollars, and I think it’s bigger
now than the national intelligence community of all countries
put together. I think it is going to grow, and business intelli-
gence investment is going to be much larger than for nation-
al security.
Tuðman: I believe in the future the intelligence community will
grow more than the military. The intelligence community will
be more important, in order to protect a country or society
from the threat of terrorism. Someone mentioned that terror-
ist groups of less than 100 or 200 people can present a seri-
ous threat, and that there is no need to activate brigades or
divisions against such groups. On the other hand, because of
the growth of business intelligence, the role of national intel-
ligence services is now only one segment of intelligence activ-
ities. That means the role of business intelligence will grow,
and maybe we can’t address the issue of bureaucratization of
systems because the system will soon be organized on a com-55
pletely different basis. But to answer your question: if our
intelligence community were bureaucratized, how would that
occur? My answer is very simple. We were too small and too
busy to be bureaucratized. The size of our services is not a
secret. We have fewer officers than journalists in a typical
daily or weekly paper. That means that we were not big
enough to have become a bureaucratic organization. In
Croatia, we developed an intelligence community from four
services; three were established during the last ten years. They
did not exist previously because Croatia was not an inde-
pendent and sovereign state, so everything started from
scratch. We established an intelligence community, but it was
not easy to establish cooperation among various services in
the beginning. After a couple years, the other services real-
ized that cooperation was advantageous for them. Croatia
was at war and none of the services wanted to take the risk
or responsibility for possible failure, and that was the main
rationale for cooperation among the services. On the other
hand, we were in a position to cooperate closely with police
and law enforcement services; that is, customs, financial
police, and criminal police. We achieved a lot of success
here.
Kerr: I think you have to look at why that bureaucracy exists.
Fundamentally, it’s a accretion of various functional organi-
zations that were brought together primarily during the Cold
War. There was a compelling need to understand Soviet
strategic forces. Out of that grew this very complex organiza-
tion, very bureaucratic, but capable of meeting the Soviet
strategic military threat. In some ways, it is not well adjusted
to the problems of today. At the same time you can’t scrap it
all, you can’t say ‘well, we’ll start out again’, for a variety of
reasons. Some of it is very valuable. The problem is how do
you take what you have and focus on a new set of problems
with new eyes? It is very difficult for organizations to recreate
themselves. Concerning the likelihood of significant changes
in the intelligence community, I think it will become more
effective in dealing with current problems, and this doesn’t
mean that because its bureaucratic it isn’t effective. 
Lacoste: I would like to raise another point: the connection
between the decision-making and information systems. It is a
major problem. Every country has its own governmental tra-
ditions. There are many common features between the
American and the British intelligence communities, but they
are not the same. The differences are based on history and
national cultures. In British society, we see several centuries of
merchant, naval, and imperial tradition. The British had to
learn how to deal with the complexities of managing a world-56
wide empire, to take responsibility and, at the same time,
handle internal political issues (i.e., in India, Malaysia, and
Africa), and foreign policy in and outside Europe. Their cul-
ture on intelligence issues is very different from the French.
Their military traditions are in many aspects not comparable
with ours, and their political institutions are also very differ-
ent.
Kerr: To be frank, though, you have to be very careful, because
the British live off US information. They don’t have to do all
of the hard stuff. They can step in at the top and look at the
big issues.
Lacoste: Yes, we know that everything doesn’t originate in
England.
Kerr: And if you want to look at failures, you might look at the his-
tory of British failure to anticipate change. I wouldn’t give the
British too much credit for brilliance in predicting the future.
The years 1930, 1940, 1941, the Far East, and the Middle
East are replete with examples of poor intelligence.
Everybody has a problem predicting the future. The US is not
unique in its failure at times to predict the future.
Lacoste: But unlike us they are not confronted with frequent elec-
tions, political change, and so forth. There is more continuity
than in other democracies, which is good. 
Dedijer:ij I want to raise an issue that’s extremely important, and
that is democracy and intelligence. Bill Colby and I devel-
oped a list of the main traits of the current intelligence revo-
lution. One was insight and control; a country has to know
what intelligence is doing. Miro, you said about two years
ago that you were going to expose what’s going on in
Croatian intelligence, and you wrote a long article about it.
But there is no publicity in Croatia about what they are doing.
All you hear about is that the President is fighting about
whose is going to be the chief of intelligence, but you don’t
see anything about what in fact intelligence is. Why do we
need it? Why do the businessmen need it? Why does the
whole country need it, and why should books be published
about it? I think Europe is much more conservative in pub-
lishing material about intelligence issues. England publishes
quite a lot. I think that in the smaller countries like Croatia,
they think everything should be kept secret, away from the
public, but in a democracy you must publish and talk about
it.
Tuðman: Here everything is going in the opposite direction. This
government is so democratic that they concluded it’s better to
eradicate the services; unfortunately, they are dealing with the
Americans, and the Americans want to preserve cooperation.
Because of that, the services still exist. I’m joking, but the real57
problem here is… Unfortunately my opinion about the cur-
rent situation here is that we are not capable of discussing the
role of intelligence and because of that, they don’t want to
even know intelligence can be used. You see this in the
media, the President of the Republic said the same thing, and
so did the government. So when you don’t even know how or
want to do that, control of the services is even less important.
From that point of view, the situation is bad. But the issue of
multilateral and bilateral cooperation is very important. 
Dedijer:ij I was at a meeting two weeks ago attended by six heads
of Croatian firms: Pliva, Podravka, and so on, and I asked
them: ‘Tell me, where do you get your information in the
office? When you come to the office, what is the first thing
you read? Who do you talk to? Do you have a system for
doing that? Do your people supply you with information?’ It
was very interesting. How does an individual businessman
acquire the necessary knowledge to make a profit? That is
what intelligence is, information. 
Kerr: There is a fundamental difference between information and
intelligence. I think that we often confuse the two. Information
is all kinds of stuff; intelligence is putting it together in a rel-
evant way to support national policy. I’ve had considerable
experience with business intelligence, and I’m not impressed.
I think they’re amateurs at best, and are focused on a specif-
ic problem— their product relative to other people’s prod-
ucts. If you can’t figure that out, you are in deep trouble in
business. It differs so dramatically from a problem of a coun-
try, let alone a country like the United States, that sees itself
as having interests everywhere. Everything involves its busi-
ness, so I don’t think they’re comparable kind of issues.
Dedijer:ij A big cooperation has to know what’s going on in the
world.
Smith:i Not the same way the government does.
Dedijer:ij They have to know exactly what’s going on in the world.
That’s global intelligence. A big cooperation has to have
intelligence about the competitors and customers. What do
the customers want? Why did they decide to buy my product
and not other products? They’ve got to have intelligence
about their colleagues. Croatia is about 400 on the list of
world economies, with 20 billion dollars. If you think of
Croatia as a corporation, what do I have to know about the
world? How am I going to use that information? How am I
going to get this information cheaply and act upon it? That
applies to everything, so I don’t think there is a big difference
between them; some are more effective than others.
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Cosic:i I would like to make some comments on the business intel-
ligence conference, which took place here a few weeks ago.
I was very disappointed that it was just a discussion about
business intelligence, without clear definition, goals, and
objectives. First of all, there were no relevant discussions.
There were no intelligent questions asked regarding business
intelligence. Each company somehow has to define its strate-
gy. Everyone was saying strategy, strategy, but no one never
explained how to devise a strategy. There was no discussion
regarding business intelligence. There were no points of inter-
section with well-organized national security. The conference
lacked clear vision and that’s why there were no results. This
year the number of participants compared with last year was
two times less. 
Smith:i How did we get into business intelligence from police intel-
ligence and national intelligence? This is a very important
question: merging police intelligence and national intelli-
gence. It has to be done, but it is difficult. You are dealing
with two organizations that probably don’t like each other
very much, have different types of sources and handle them
differently, and finally have not had much experience
exchanging intelligence with each other. We in the States
have that problem with the FBI. I would like to think that we
are both mature and experienced, but we still have the prob-
lem, and the FBI has that problem with the police forces. 
Kerr: One is fundamentally a police force without any analytic
capability, whose purpose is to convict people and throw
them in jail, and the other is an organization that takes infor-
mation and makes it relevant to national security issues.
Ferš: In this session we heard that the intelligence and police sys-
tems in the United States have not radically changed, if I’ve
understood well. It’s possible to change something with new
people and new ideas, but this is not the new vision of intel-
ligence. Do you think the system you have now in your coun-
try is capable of using new methods to confront the new chal-
lenges that emerged after September 11?
Kerr: I don’t think there’s any question that it’s not adequate. They
have a long way to go to begin to even speak to each other
on common terms. There are certainly things that can and will
be done to improve that, there is going to be an improvement
in the connections between those organizations and an
improvement in the flow of information across the organiza-
tion. But I think there are some very fundamental problems
that are going to be hard to overcome. One is the American
population’s concern with a national police force and more
intrusive law enforcement. Those are going to be major
obstacles. Then, as Stevan mentioned, if you think there’s59
bureaucracy in the intelligence community, you have not seen
anything yet until you look at the bureaucracy in the domes-
tic organization. There are 20 or 30 of them that probably
need to talk to each other, each one in a different part of the
department in the government, and there are major problems
of connectivity. While things can be done to improve things,
it is a major undertaking.
Ferš: I am not talking about inside the United States, but about
cooperation with other services in the world; for instance,
cooperation on one side and partnership on the other side.
There need to be changes in all the intelligence communities
in the world.
Tuðman: If I can raise a similar question. You just mentioned that
intelligence is for collecting information for national security,
and the police force task is to put people in jail, but when we
are discussing a need for international cooperation, what
happens when national security intelligence is collected in
one country, appears in the police files in another, and is used
as evidence to jail someone to limit or prohibit his activities?
That means a source giving information is free to travel in this
country but in another country is limited in his activities, which
was certainly not the intention. We need to resolve this issue,
because it also creates a major problem between police and
intelligence services.
Lacoste: It is not just a professional problem for police and intel-
ligence services, or a question of internal and external secu-
rity. This is about the real democratization of society, which
includes judicial issues and the role of lawyers. You probably
know that we captured the well- known international terrorist,
Carlos. He is responsible for many actions in my country in
which several people lost their lives. His trial took place a few
years ago, and he is now in jail in Paris. Two months ago, I
was summoned by a French judge because he had received
a complaint from Carlos charging me, as well as several
other French officials, with plotting to murder him. Isn’t this an
excessive use of ‘civil rights’ ? The ‘mafiosis’ do the same
thing. The mafia bosses are experts in taking advantage of
the subtleties of law and judicial procedures to escape con-
viction. Many terrorists do this as well. In the case of Islamic
terrorism, we are confronted with another problem existing in
modern societies: the ‘gray areas’. Gray areas are areas
which are lawless or outside the control of the law; for exam-
ple, certain suburbs of major cities, and parts of poor, under-
developed countries. The police is not allowed to enter. Other
laws are in effect, the laws of the most violent, the laws of the
drug dealers.
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Wolf:l There is one issue I suppose we have to discuss. I’m not
sure whether we can establish an international convention on
legal rules for intelligence services, but perhaps we should do
our best to prepare something like it.
I think in cases of terrorist actions prepared and executed
within one country, the legal aspects should be in harmony
with the national law in terms of criminal prosecution and
punishment. The fight against internationally directed and
externally planned operations must comply with international
law. The use of international law in cases of terrorist acts is, I
think, an issue that comes up often. 
There are many other questions, and I will ask some of them
just to be provocative. Do services have the right to kill or tor-
ture if they are able lay their hands on terrorists or suspected
terrorists? There has been a lot of discussion about this sub-
ject recently. I get a lot of interview requests on this specific
question: what should services be permitted to do under cir-
cumstances such as occurred last year? Tuðman: What kind
of legal consequences will the government face if it shoots
down civilian airplanes, for example? 
Wolf:l We spoke a lot yesterday about the necessity for more
human intelligence inside terror organizations, but if you
have such an agent, what is he allowed to do? In the past
there were examples of agents in organizations like the Red
Army Faction. In one case, one of these agents participated
in the organization of an explosion in a prison, and there are
many other such examples. This is a very sensitive and diffi-
cult question. 
Dedijer: ij I would like to start. The issue of the legal basis for or
constraints on intelligence is much broader than these two
terrorist incidents. What happens when intelligence changes
occur is that it has to be decided which earlier methods and
activities can be legalized. I know, for example, that civilian
airlines have been used for intelligence purposes. I think there
should be an international convention forbidding this. The
first one caught would have his head chopped off. I think we
should be examining all intelligence activity today, including
business intelligence and other forms from the legal point of
view. What can be done internationally to advance coopera-
tion and obtain information from all kinds of sources, but
within legal boundaries? This will never be a gentlemen’s
game. That question I will leave to the lawyers. We agree that
there are international laws forbidding certain acts, but I think
we should look beyond this horrible act in New York; the dis-
cussion should be broader. 
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Kerr: My first reaction is to argue that the United States would be
reluctant to embark upon a set of rules that would limit the
actions of the US intelligence community. I think that would
begin a very slippery slope, a process which, at least from my
perspective, would not only be dangerous but also difficult to
enforce. The issue of torture is very interesting. I think torture
dehumanizes the torturer. The implications of torture for those
who are doing the torturing are significant. If I were respon-
sible for the intelligence organizations, I would not allow it or
condone its use by countries supporting us. I think you have
to be very careful about the words used and their precise
meaning. I think political assassination aimed at an individ-
ual is unacceptable. This action could set in motion a train of
events and retaliation that you cannot control. Just from a US
perspective, I think we’re more vulnerable than the people we
go after. On the other hand, I would differentiate political
assassination from a preemptive attempt to stop a terrorist
operation. I would have no compunction whatsoever about
that. A preemption for self-protection is quite different than
an attack on an individual.
Smith:i I would like to address the question of whether agents
should be allowed to participate in terrorism. I start from the
fact that a penetration agent in a terrorist organization is a
very valuable agent, and is in the position to save lives and
prevent great physical damage. It is very difficult to recruit a
penetration of a terrorist organization. Because of their
potential for saving lives and the difficultly in acquiring a pen-
etration it is of great importance to preserve and extend their
operational life. This often comes down to the issue of
whether the agent should be allowed to participate in the ter-
rorist act he has warned about, and in which his organization
has directed him to participate. If he refuses to participate, he
may be punished by the leadership of the terrorist organiza-
tion [this might mean his death or that he is marginalized in
the organization]. Neither outcome is good for the service
running the agent because he will have lost his access and
hence be unable to warn of future terrorist operations
planned by his group. Therefore, it would seem necessary to
occasionally permit an agent to participate in a terrorist act
so that his ability to continue to report is preserved. The infor-
mation he provides regarding the planned terrorist operation
should allow the authorities to thwart the operation in a way
that prevents loss of life but protects the source.
Kerr: I’m not sure I agree with Doug. I wouldn’t like to be the per-
son who had to stand up before oversight committees and the
press and explain why he allowed an agent to knowingly
commit a major terrorist attack. Now it is a matter of scale.62
Can you belong to a terrorist organization? Can you partici-
pate at a certain level? But if they were actually involved in
the killing of other people, innocent people, I find that inde-
fensible, so I think Doug and I will probably have a little dis-
agreement.
Dedijer:ij I’ll just point out that the two gentlemen who just spoke
were speaking as representatives of the US intelligence com-
munity, but there are other entitities in the United States. For
example, Book 5 of the Church Committee on Intelligence in
1977 speaks about assassination, and there are all kinds of
arguments opposing this idea. This is the most interesting dis-
cussion we’ve had these past two days, on this legal question.
Can the international community, not the United States but
the international community starting with Europe, introduce
an initiative to examine the legality of intelligence procedures
and methods, and what should be legalized? 
Boyadjiev:ji While doing my homework, I tried to summarize the
existing treaties, European and UN, which consider terrorism
a crime. Maybe it would be helpful to cite some of the laws
so we can see what is missing. I started on the basis that ter-
rorism as a crime is connected to other crimes such as arms
trafficking, drug dealing, racketeering, trafficking of human
beings, smuggling, and money laundering. All those crimes
exist, and all or part of them are committed during the prepa-
ration of a terrorist act. The legal framework of the European
Union thus far consists of the Convention on the suppression
of terrorism; Convention on mutual assistance in criminal
matters; Convention on extradition; Convention of launder-
ing, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from
crime; and Convention on the international validity of crimi-
nal judgments. The United Nations instrumentation consists
of Convention for the suppression of financing of terrorism;
Convention against the taking of hostages; Convention for
the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft; Convention for
the suppression of terrorist bombing; Measures to eliminate
international terrorism. There are a lot of documents that pro-
vide a legal basis for fighting terrorism. I am referring to
Europe and the UN, not to national laws. And two more
things. I’ll try to summarize the parts about sharing interna-
tional experience on terrorist crime and criminal procedures
against terrorism. Here we find procedures related to the col-
lection of evidence and proofs of the existence of a terrorist
organization; governmental decisions about terrorist activi-
ties; investigative tools; intelligence analysis; punishment
standards; confiscation of property; specialized branches for
investigation and justice. The final thing to summarize is how
I envision a model law on antiterrorism, and what is needed63
to harmonize the relevant legislation. First of all we have to
describe all forms of terrorism as criminal acts with penalties
that must be enforced. We must have investigative tools for
detection of explosives, chemicals, nuclear materials and so
on; definition of modus operandi - kidnapping, bombing,
threats and other forms of terrorism or methods used in a ter-
rorist operation; the uncovering of logistical support – oper-
ational, financial and personnel; and regulations concerning
people under immunity and international protection. How
can we ensure that the diplomatic pouches of a certain coun-
try do not contain materials which will be used to assist a ter-
rorist operation? And then there is introduction of evidence;
examination of witnesses and victim protection; and interna-
tional cooperation and exchange of information. I think we
are still lacking some legal instruments, but we are on the
right path to creating an acceptable legal basis for fighting
terrorism.
Tuðman: International and national security policy requires an
understanding and definition of terrorism which reflect the
principles and philosophy of international and national secu-
rity policy. Everything is related. We have already agreed
there are many definitions of terror and terrorism. Basically, it
always involves illegal use of force or violence against peo-
ple. It’s easy to reach agreement that destruction, killing, and
violence are unacceptable, and that human life holds the
highest value. But how do we classify political activities and
the legal or illegal use of force applied not to destroy lives,
but to eradicate identity, values, and interests? For example:
one of the basic legal principles of international political
behavior is the use of pressure. We are continually faced with
the one government using pressure against another govern-
ment or country. There are so many different ways to apply
pressure. From an ethical and philosophical point of view,
how can we condone force used against national interests
and values, forcing people to change their values? Let’s
agree, for example, that Talibans do not behave appropri-
ately towards women. We can agree that that behavior is not
acceptable, but from a moral point of view there is always a
set of values which belongs to a certain cultural, political,
and social identity. From a philosophical point of view, is it
acceptable to destroy the cultural, political, or social identity
of a nation or social entity? From that point of view, I believe
we are talking nowadays about terrorism and terrorist opera-
tions only in a narrow sense. There are so many ways to use
and abuse force. So I believe that it’s possible to make a dis-
tinction between hard terror and soft terror. Hard terror
accompanied by killing, violence, and destruction is not easy64
to accept, but it is easier to recognize and define. Soft terror
is oriented to subverting national interests and values by
using pressure, political force, or other means to change the
identity of a nation or political group against its will.
Intelligence activities, covert operations, disinformation,
information warfare, etc., play an important role in soft terror.
So I think we need to recognize and define all kind of terror-
ism in order to develop the basic principles on which inter-
national and national security policy can be organized.
Dedijer:ij In 1980 I was invited to attend a conference in Turin by
the Democracia pro Italija. They were holding lectures for
members of Parliament in Italy, and I discovered most of the
members of Democracija pro Italija were policemen. They
invited me and a lot of interesting people from all over the
world. People who were not free and who wanted to be free.
Your father, Miro, was in prison because he wanted to make
Croatia independent from Communism. At that conference I
started talking to an Italian and told him that the Palestinians
are a people without a country. They can’t live in their own
country. He asked me if I would like to meet the Palestinians.
I said yes. So I flew to Tunis and met up with one of the lead-
ers of the Palestinians at that time. He said that Arafat want-
ed to meet me. They wanted to know in what way I could
help. I suggested we call a conference of people who are not
free in the world. I made a list: the Irish, the Kurds, and a lot
of others. I met Abu Jihad, one of those who organized the
Munich attack on the Israelis. I contacted a member of the
United States Social Sciences Council, who is a Mexican, and
he said ‘what a wonderful idea, let’s get together.’ So imag-
ine if we had instead of us sitting here representatives of all
the people who do not feel free. How would they view terror-
ism? Terrorism is a poor man’s war, which is a definition that
is very hard to swallow in the United States. I have always
been pro-Irish and I am glad that they have discussed revo-
lution. Let’s look at things in broader terms than this incident
in the United States. I think that if the Arabs had succeeded
in organizing this conference, your father would have come
to the conference, Miro; most Croatians would have come. I
read this morning in the Herald Tribune that the prince is
advocating free elections in Saudi Arabia.
Lacoste: I believe there is a legal framework. For example, in
most countries peace and wartime laws are different. The
legal powers of various institutions in the United States are
different. But I have said for many years that the traditional
distinction between wartime and peacetime is becoming less
and less relevant. The Gulf War was legitimized because
Saddam Hussein was foolish enough to attack his neighbor,65
Kuwait, enabling the US to obtain a positive vote in the
United Nations Security Council. After September 11, they
did not receive formal approval to launch military operations
in Afghanistan in order to kill or capture Bin Laden. It is not
‘war-time. 
Let us consider the history of Israel since 1948. When it was
created, the founders behaved like violent terrorists (i.e., in
the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem). But since
they were fighting to survive and not to be destroyed by the
surrounding Arab countries which were threatening to wipe
Israel off the map, their terrorism was ‘morally authorized’ for
self-protection and self-defense. Nowadays the situation is
not the same. Tsahal is not in the same situation as before the
‘Six Day War’ or the ‘Yom Kippur War’. They are now
engaged in a different kind of war, an asymetrical war waged
against individual terrorists. Their huge military assets, tanks,
highly sophisticated planes and attack helicopters, are being
used against civilian objectives, to kill individuals, one man
after another. Is this ‘war’ , a confrontation between two
armies fighting in true military tradition? 
I remember how Israel’s Prime Minister Golda Meir reacted
after the terrorist action at the Olympic games in Munich. She
ordered the Mossad to go throughout Europe to search and
kill the terrorists. When Mossad agents made a mistake in
Norway, killing an innocent citizen of Morocco, there was a
scandal in the world press and the public was outraged. But
she bravely assumed responsibility. Other Chiefs of State
have not acted the same way in similar circumstances. Today,
we need to endorse unilateral definitions for crimes and ille-
gal actions within a new global framework, so that the United
Nations can adopt international rules allowing governments
and the international community to act against terrorism and
international crime. However, the principle of self-defense
would remain unchanged. It’s in the United Nations Charter.
Section III
Legal, ethical and media aspects of 
‘Intelligence Wars’.
Meðimorec:i I would like to talk about the moral aspects of the
intelligence profession. Admiral, I read your interview in
today’s paper. You stressed an important point – the morali-
ty of this profession. When I was called in 1992 to take one
of the leading positions in our intelligence community, I was66
honored, but at the same time confused and reluctant to
accept that responsibility. The late President asked me per-
sonally to join the service. My perception of this profession
was biased by the negative examples and practices of Tito’s
former secret police. The secret services in communist
Yugoslavia, civilian and military, controlled every aspect of
our lives. Their methods were harsh, brutal, and terrifying,;
there was even a rhyme that ‘OZNA sve dozna’, ‘The secret
police knows everything’! The former Yugoslavian secret
police fought a bitter war against the so-called enemies of
Socialist Yugoslavia; in fact, against people who left
Yugoslavia, dissatisfied with the dictatorial nature of its
regime. People were killed all over Western Europe; even lib-
eral political activists who advocated democratization were
persecuted. The majority of people, especially Croatian intel-
lectuals, rejected any connection with such a compromised
profession. A lot of prejudice existed. Even now, due to con-
tinuing media influence and bias, the majority of people in
Croatia considers the intelligence profession to be dirty,
immoral, and unacceptable. Terms like spies, dirty, illegal,
indecent methods, and immorality are used to describe this
profession. I talked to the late President about my dilemma,
that I wasn’t sure whether this profession was moral. Secret
services participated in killings, kidnappings, and assassina-
tions. I was not ready to perform such deeds. The late
President rejected all my arguments, explaining that during
World War Two, the top intellectuals in US and Britain were
members of intelligence services. Even today, they are proud
of their efforts in fighting Nazi Germany. Members of the
intelligence profession in a democracy are responsible, he
told me, for gathering and analyzing data. They are not
members of a law-enforcement agency. And there is nothing
immoral in collecting information, he said. I was finally per-
suaded by his arguments and agreed to enter the profession.
From time to time, moral dilemmas have emerged. And I
have learned that intelligence work is not only collecting
information. Sometimes it is more than that – especially in
time of war. What if I should, in the name of the State, be
forced to perform an act which is against my conscience?
What should I do? But I was never asked to do such a thing.
The late President had told me the truth. In our service
nobody was ever asked to perform an immoral, indecent, or
criminal act. But this ethical dilemma will always be a funda-
mental one – the difference between morality and immorali-
ty; the thin red line which separates them. How do we deal
with the under-cover agent who has infiltrated a terrorist
organization such as Al Qaeda? Should he under certain67
special circumstances be permitted to act as a member of this
terrorist organization? Should he be allowed to perpetrate an
act against civilians or citizens of his own country? Which
moral imperative is higher – toward the individual or the
state? This is a perpetual dilemma and it has to be dealt with
case by case.
Kerr: I would like to go back to the issue the Admiral and Miro
raised. It seems to me it would be unwise to try to define with
precision the nature of terrorism and the equivalency of vari-
ous kinds of terrorism. We cannot put on the same legal or
moral equivalent the September 11 event and the killings
conducted by both sides in the Palestinian/ Israeli conflict.  
Smith:i The question of whether the asset, a penetration of a ter-
rorist organization, should be permitted to commit a terrorist
act is a very delicate but very important one. It is a difficult
operational, political, and moral question. I want to be sure
I do not leave the impression that I think the most important
thing is to protect the agent; the most important thing is to
prevent the attack, but a great effort should be made to pro-
tect the agent so that he can serve again. Stop the attack and
preserve the agent’s security - these two objectives must be
met if possible, although obviously stopping the attack takes
priority.
Wolf:l We can’t separate the aspects of an intelligence war from
the current war. Yesterday I had my problems with the term
‘war’, but an intelligence war has now been declared against
terrorism. I think it was good that Todor gave examples of
existing conventions, international law, and of course we also
have national laws in our countries, but the discussion has
shown it is not easy to use all the rules of law. We can’t allow
the terrorists of September 11 to destroy the efforts we have
made to establish some kind of international law. It seems to
me a bit abstract that if a terrorist act is committed in one
country, there exists a national law and it is possible to fight
the terrorists and these activities on the basis of this national
law. In the fight against international terrorism it’s necessary
to use existing rules; of course, they are not good enough,
but they exist and I think it would be very dangerous to disre-
gard them. I think the American government, the American
president understood this when they tried to obtain a United
Nations approval (but not during the Kosovo war). This is a
very abstract statement, but I think it is the basis to use.
Lacoste: I can raise another point. There are real differences
between countries, even democratic countries. Look at the
death sentence. Most democratic countries have abolished it.
You can put a criminal in jail for life but not kill him. There
are fierce debates between, for example, the US and several68
European countries on this issue. I agree with you; there are
limits to theoretical discussions, even about the right of self-
defense. In order to choose the best ‘ways and means’ one
has to consider the circumstances. Let’s look again at the sit-
uation in Israel; wouldn’t you say they are implementing the
old Bible precept ‘eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth’ ? We are
horrified by this behavior because we know it is unleashing
endless bloodshed and hatred.
Wolf:l There must be no license for killing in the services. Of
course in a special situation - and Dick gave examples - it
might happen, but then you have to use the right to self-
defense. I agree with this. To give such an order would
require a very special situation, and there must be a ruling
from somebody who is empowered to give the order. This is
a big problem. As to torture, we had advisers in Arab and
African countries; in the GDR, and by orders of the Minister
of Security of the GDR, there was a law prohibiting torture.
Our advisers in Ethiopia and East Africa, however, observed
some instances of torture and failed to respond. We did not
want to train people for that kind of interrogation. There were
recent reports in American publications about a joint co-
operation between operatives of CIA and the Albanian Secret
Service to arrest suspected Jihad members. They were
brought to Egypt, and in Egypt they were tortured. They con-
fessed their participation in terrorist activities; two of them
were sentenced to death, and others to long- term imprison-
ment. 
Should the use of torture be tolerated in the fight against ter-
rorism? I think if we say there is no right to give an order to
kill, then there is no right to give an order to torture, either,
and we have to say this categorically. If, of course, the terri-
ble attack on September 11 is used as an example, if terror-
ists surrounded by special forces resist arrest by force of arms,
they can then be shot. But if captured, they should not be
killed. This is the rule in civilized countries, and it is necessary
to emphasize this. 
Lacoste: It is easier to deal with these delicate matters from a the-
oretical point of view than when you are engaged in action.
I am old enough to remember some realities about war: in
Europe, Indo-China, and Algeria, for example. Many times
commanding officers had to subdue their own soldiers who
had gone crazy after seeing friends horribly tortured by the
enemy. There is a lot of discussion now in my country about
torture in Algeria. It is not just an ethical problem; above
all,it’s a political debate. Nothing is said against the Algerian
FLN terrorists who perpetrated horrible actions against inno-
cent civilian victims for years. The French Army is the only tar-69
get. Our governmenet was powerless to stop terrorism in the
streets of Algiers, where bombings were a daily occurrence.
They asked the military to do what the police was no longer
able to do. Within a few days, they caught the main terrorist
leaders and restored security. Of course there were some
excesses during these tense times; we see a similar situation
in Palestine between Tsahal and the Palestinians resisting col-
onization. There are no definitive solutions here. But I’d like
to cite an old rule from the Catholic Church: if you have to
make a choice based on your conscience, between two evils,
then you consider which is the lesser of the two. If you can
exert violent pressure upon a suspect in order to save hun-
dreds of civilians, would you refuse to do so ? This is a
human decision under real circumstances, and the theorizing
of irresponsible intellectuals lends little to the discussion. Do
you agree?
Tuðman: We’re mixing things up a little, because we were talking
about the approach and response to terror and the role of
intelligence. Intelligence services do not have law enforce-
ment units so they are usually not performing law enforce-
ment tasks. So if you are allowed to do something, it doesn’t
mean the intelligence service will be involved. The moral
problem still exists, but I think it would be a bigger problem
if intelligence services collect intelligence and somebody else
executes the action. But if we are talking about the legal
framework, I think there has to be a division. Very often we
have to solve a problem quickly, so we have to find a way to
create a legal structure to address such circumstances. As I
said, what I don’t like is force. We have to observe basic prin-
ciples or a legal framework; otherwise we are in a very diffi-
cult situation. If we are talking about international terrorism,
certain international principles and laws must exist and must
be followed by every partner. Those who are contemplating
committing a crime need to create a legal basis. 
Kerr: Todor presented a long list of UN prohibitions against ter-
rorism. My question is, have these had any impact? Is there
any reason to believe that a long list approved and passed by
the United Nations has had any impact on the actions of
members of the UN? I’m skeptical, but I don’t know the
answer to that question.
Lange: Just out of curiosity: what is the legal basis for President
Bush’s statement that ‘we want this Bin Laden guy, I want to
catch him or to kill him?’ To the best of my knowledge, he has
not been convicted by the courts, not even in absentia.
Kerr: He’s been indicted by the US Justice Department. In accor-
dance with American law he will be brought to trial.
Lange: Can he be killed as well?70
Smith:i That’s where the war part comes in.
Kerr: That’s not possible; he hasn’t been convicted yet.
Lange:So what is the legal position? They say that they can locate
him and then direct a laser-guided bomb to his cave or tent
and kill him. But what is the definition of this war? War in
international law is something different. This is a different kind
of war, one that hasn’t been described yet by international
law.
Kerr: Your observation is right. I don’t think the President’s assert-
ing that he’s doing this under any particular legal framework
or under any law; he is asserting that we will do it.
Smith:i Under the law of self-defense.
Wolf:l I would like to add one statement to Todor’s list that I noted
here before our discussion. Any order to kill violates the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which stip-
ulates that every person charged with an offense is to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty. He’s proven guilty or
innocent in a public trial in accordance with the law, and he
should be given all guarantees necessary for his defense. In
my opinion there is no denying that after September 11 there
might be, as far as human and civil rights are concerned, a
relapse into a situation which was thought to be a thing of the
past. Now in the United States and Germany a lot of laws
have been changed. It is understandable because of this sit-
uation and the terrible events of September 11, but I think it’s
necessary to understand that civil rights activists might
become suspicious. That applies to the imposition of military
jurisdiction for suspected foreigners in the USA, and for a
considerable expansion of the powers of secret services and
police powers by amendments to the law in the Federal
Republic of Germany. This is the reason for my beginning
statement; I think it would be dangerous to allow terrorists to
have such an influence on democratic life and regulations.
Measures against terrorist activities, yes, but in Germany we
are looking now at the implementation of all-encompassing
surveillance which will affect millions of people.
Kerr: I don’t think you’d want to confuse rhetoric with the legal
position the Government would take. But if I can go back to
something that you raised, I agree with you that we have to
be very careful about changing rules we’ve established and
developed over many years to protect our rights and our free-
dom. I think the Americans are particularly cautious of that.
The other point though is that your own rules are used
against you and become your vulnerabilities as well. Then the
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question is what right do you have to protect yourself when
there is a direct use of your own freedoms to attack the very
freedoms that you’re trying to protect? That is an interesting
problem.
Lacoste: Along the same lines, I think it is the obligation of every
government not only to punish but to prevent and deter. That
is why the law must punish criminals and terrorists harshly to
deter others. Of course the law must also protect civil rights,
but one must be careful not to indulge in other excesses.
There is an example in my country of socialist politicians,
probably driven by generous, idealistic motivations, voting in
new laws which provide suspects with the opportunity to
escape justice with the aid of astute lawyers. A few weeks after
the laws were implemented, there was a large rise in crimi-
nality. The young people living in the poor ‘gray’ areas of
some suburbs realized that they could break the law yet
remain unpunished. We must stick to moral, democratic rules
protecting the individuual, but at the same time devote atten-
tion to rights and obligations toward society. Take the situa-
tion where one state is threatened by another; it is morally
defensible to maintain a strong military to deter aggression.
Dedijer:ij I realize the deep shock of this event on the United States
mass psychology. It is much deeper than I thought. I think
time will cure that shock. I’m not going to take seriously much
of what you have said because I think you’re all under shock.
What have I learned about war? If you read my memoirs
about the war, you’ll see that all the things my mother taught
me - don’t lie, don’t kill, don’t steal, don’t destroy – have all
been turned upside down by war. In war you kill, you destroy,
you lie, whatever you can do. I think the danger of this whole
idea of war against terorrism is that it gives us permission to
do whatever we want. I’ve said for a long time that the United
States is the most democratic and creative country in the
world, but not the best country. I think Sweden, Scandinavia,
many European countries are better countries socially, more
comfortable to live in, better than the United States. I think we
should look at what I mentioned earlier, that the people who
are not free have no other weapon to use but terrorism.
We’ve got to consider how to eliminate that.
Cosic:i Ethical and moral aspects of this problem are very impor-
tant, but how about a systematic approach to the problem?
What about education and training, which are fundamental
for future agents, analysts, and decision makers? Of course
some people will have problems performing their missions
under certain circumstances, so how can a compromise be
made in view of legal or moral constraints? We need more
education to deal with this issue. It is not only an individual72
but a general dilemma: how to be effective, how to fulfill the
mission and at the same time respect legal and ethical con-
straints. We still have major problems seven years after the
war. We have to build a common culture through appropri-
ate curricula. What about the code of conduct, do we have
code of conduct? 
Kerr: I think the answer is we do have a code of conduct; we do
have a training program that talks about the ethics of intelli-
gence. We talk about the very issues that we’re talking about
here. We talk about our own legal structure and the require-
ments of executive orders, the limitations, the oversight
process, and the law in terms of congressional oversight. We
spend a good deal of time talking to our young officers about
this very aspect. I’m sorry I talk too much but I always have to
respond to Stevan. I think he’s mistaken in his judgment that
this event of September 11 is going to be forgotten relatively
quickly. I think the implications of this event are significant.
While the war, the military conflict in Afghanistan, will go
away in the not too distant future, it would be a serious mis-
take to assume that other things growing out of this attack of
September 11 are going to disappear soon. I think the
changes will be seen in our legal systems, our conduct over-
seas, and our attitude toward our allies and friends and ene-
mies. I think it will be seen in our response to weapons of
mass destruction and our responses to the Islamic world. I’m
not saying that as a US spokesman but I think you are under-
estimating the wider implications of this. You said something
the other day that I found very interesting, you said an intelli-
gence officer’s responsibility is strictly to predict the future. I
would say, no, no, no, not predict the future. What you do is
provide some warning and assess the implications of events.
As an intelligence officer I cannot predict events in the Middle
East, but I can assess the implications of various outcomes
based on my knowledge of the area and of current events. 
Lacoste: The point about the code of conduct is interesting. As in
other allied armies, we in the French Navy have also had pre-
cise ‘rules of conduct’ and ‘rules of engagement’. I remem-
ber how difficult it has been to explain that to our politicians,
when most of them were ignorant of conditions required for
the use of military force. They were reluctant to assume
responsibility. When you asked them when you were allowed
to use your weapon, under which circumstances, and in
which way, they only gave a vague or irrelevant answer. We
prepared precise lists of all eventual scenarios in order to
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facilitate a dialogue between the officer in charge of using
military force, and the government leader in charge of mak-
ing the political decision. I think we should do the same thing
between the politicians and those in charge of intelligence.
Wolf:l But bear in mind that hundreds of soldiers, border guards
of the former GDR, were brought to trial because they used
their weapons, they followed an order.
Meðimorec:i There is a lack of law and order, a lack of an ethical
code, a ‘code of conduct’. Legal and ethical regulations are
always closely linked. Now we are back at the starting point.
We must create a new set of laws in order to fight terrorism.
If we create a new set of rules for post-September 11 engage-
ment, we should know exactly what terrorism is. We will have
rules on the activities of the law-enforcement agencies, intel-
ligence services, and armed forces. But we can still make mis-
takes in distinctions between terrorism, liberation movements,
and struggles for national freedom. There are nuances and
differences we should be aware of. The whole world is in the
process of re-evaluation; barriers are falling, technology is
uniting the world in a thus far incomprensible manner.
Philosophers, scientists, artists, and politicians are seeking
new ways to explain the future. The theories of Huntington
and Fukuyama are relevant here. We should not be satisfied
with dogma; we must study all the new elements. We are
aware that terrorism has many faces, in Europe, the Middle
East, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. In different regions or countries, terrorists call
themselves freedom fighters, liberators, fighters for national
independence. We have to make a precise distinction – the-
oretical, political, cultural, and legal - between true freedom
fighters and terrorists. Democracy will have a difficult and
sophisticated battle to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan
and most likely in Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, and Iraq.
Preconditions for the growth of terrorism, disguised under the
auspices of a national movement, have been created in
Kosovo and Macedonia. If we fail to clearly define terrorism,
we are neglecting the essence of the issue. Democracies are
waging a prolonged and uncertain war, yet we can’t identify
the enemy at his core. Admiral Lacoste said in his interview
that using the army against civilians is not only illegal – it is
immoral. I fully agree with him. Future wars against terrorism
in Afghanistan or some other part of the world will probably
be a combination of intelligence (targeting) and special mili-
tary operations (destroying the enemy). Intelligence services
will look for them, and special forces using modern weapon-
ry will neutralize the terrorists. And finally, we are entering a
globalized world in which there is a push for intelligence and74
security matters to be transparent and open to society. Every
day our societies become more transparent, so everyone will
be forced to abide by the law and follow the code of conduct.
The media and public will ask more and more questions,
wanting to be informed about important matters such as
security. They will want to know what we (intelligence and
security people) are doing, and whether what we are doing is
transparent, moral, legal and above all – efficient.
Wolf:l Let me use my position to support Stevan, who has repeat-
ed his position about the causes of terrorism on several occa-
sions. Of course, it is primarily a question of policy, but the
services can support by contributing information and analy-
ses. Since September 11, the world public has felt frightened
and been deeply affected by pictures of war, aircraft carriers,
bombers, and so on. Politicians addressing the causes of ter-
ror have for the most part limited their statements to mere lip-
service. Photos - of refugees approaching the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, for example – illustrate only a small part of
the misery. In all years terrorist attacks in Israel were being
shown, where were the photos of Palestinian refugee camps?
Why is there no initiative or international plan to end the mis-
ery of the Palestinians, to do away with the camps? Why are
there not measures executed and supported with the same
intensity as the war declared by the President of the United
States? The problem of the Palestinian refugees is certainly
only one of the causes of terrorism, and a complicated and
complex problem which cannot be solved overnight. It will
take time, 
Lange: You rightfully pointed out that there are different types of
tragedies valued in different ways. Just to make one point: I
spoke to an African colleague recently and he asked me:
‘Why do those 4500 Americans appear to be more impor-
tant than the 2.5 million that were killed in Central Africa over
the last few years?’ I couldn’t give him an answer. I’m horri-
fied by the events of September 11, but on the other hand,
there are similar events occurring regularly which are less
spectacular but equally horrifying. I have no answer and I am
not passing judgment, but I just wanted to mention this.
Kerr: That is a specious argument, I have to admit. I don’t think
there is comparability at all. That does not mean some indi-
viduals are more valuable than others. There are certain
things, though, that a nation can and must act on and there
are other things that it believes either are not its direct respon-
sibility or are the responsibility of others. There is a difference
between the responsibility of the United States for 4000 peo-
ple that were killed in United States terrorist attacks and the
responsibility of the United States for a conflict between the75
Hutus and the Tutsis in Africa. A nation has a fundamental
responsibility to protect its own people. Again, I think the
Palestinian argument is not valid. They have suffered greatly
and they have been taken advantage of. They have been
pushed out of their homeland. But at the same time one has
to be a little careful about comparability again. Israel is a
democracy and it does have elections. The United States
should not have responsibility for responding to all the injus-
tice in the world. I think we can argue that in another forum. 
Lacoste: I think there’s a dangerous election practice in several
democratic regimes; that is, ‘proportionality’ is often not in
operation. Deputies elected should reflect the opinions of the
majority of citizens. This has always been Israel’s rule, for
example. As a result, religious extremists have had very little
influence in the country’s policies. By most criteria, Israel is a
real democracy; however, the radical minorities have had,
and still have today, a role that does not at all reflect nation-
al opinion. In addition to radical Arab Islamists, there are
also extremist religious tyrants in Israel promoting excessive
views. Deferring to the rule of the majority, as in the U.K. is in
my view much more efficient way to conduct policy.
Section IV
Problems and prospects concerning 
international intelligence cooperation 
and joint action in counter-terrorism.
Lessons from the EUROPOL-cooperation
Lange: Now it is our last session and the topic is: Problems and
prospects of international intelligence cooperation and joint
action in counter-terrorism, and Lessons from EUROPOL-
cooperation. I cannot say much about this, because I haven’t
been involved in police matters, and because thus far there is
too little data on EUROPOL to make a judgement. I am
approaching this topic a bit cynically, especially in regard to
cooperation. Now where do we have real cooperation in
intelligence? There are three reasons for the lack of cooper-
ation. We should not be too enthusiastic about short term
prospects for meaningful cooperation. The first problem is
national interest. What does this mean? It means that in a
concrete situation, service A is trying to exchange information
with service B, and the guideline is: always give the other one
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as much junk as you can for as much gold as you can get.
This poses a big problem. If intelligence could transcend the
boundaries of national interest and if there were a supra-
national intelligence structure, then there could be coopera-
tion. I cannot see something like this emerging, so we are still
confronted with the trading, where one is trying to cheat the
other. The French often point to the American actions during
the Bosnian war; that is, modifying satellite images in order
to influence political decisions. This is used by French col-
leagues to argue for an exclusively European intelligence
capacity in this area. Then we have a major problem with
international intelligence cooperation in the struggle against
terrorism. These terrorist networks now entail economic net-
works. I had the opportunity to look at a list of companies
established by Bin Laden cum Al-Qaeda in Sudan alone.
There are about 20 companies still active, with contacts out-
side, and this is just one country. So we have to start from the
preposition that there are huge networks, not only Al-Qaeda
but others as well.We have to take into account economic
networks connected to the regular economy, and if this is the
case, then international anti-terrorist cooperation must
include economic espionage. But when you throw your net
into the ocean of economic information wanting to catch the
herring, you also risk killing the dolphin you are supposed to
protect. This creates suspicion as well, as one suspects the
other of using the pretext of anti-terrorist intelligence to com-
mit economic espionage. The third problem for cooperation
is that there exist different intelligence cultures. Just to address
one point of view: you know you have a type of intelligence
community clearly separated between internal intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, and external intelligence; you
also have those with closely intertwined internal and external
intelligence, and it is extremely difficult for these two types to
exchange information in a meaningful way. One will be more
driven by domestic interests and have reservations the other
type of service doesn’t have. So how realistic is meaningful
cooperation? What do we have now, and what are the
prospects? Or is it just a myth?
Smith:i I think you are wrong when you say that there can’t be
good intelligence exchanges; there can be. I’ve been
involved in some very good ones, and some very bad ones.
It varies. The best are between two services, as opposed to
multi-lateral exchanges; the more services involved the more
difficult it is. However, the war on terrorism will require multi-
lateral exchanges. This was the case in Bosnia because a
number of countries were involved in operations there, and
there were productive exchanges among services in Bosnia. It77
is a myth that an intelligence service spends a lot of time try-
ing to fool the service it is having an exchange with. The only
reason to have an intelligence exchange is if both sides gain.
In short, I think that intelligence exchanges are always useful
and are vital in the war against terrorism because they enable
services to track terrorists. I think the response from European
services, as far as I can tell from news reports, has been
excellent following September 11th. 
Boyadjiev: ji OK, I would like to approach the problem from anoth-
er angle. I agree entirely with Doug, but he is talking about
bilateral cooperation and I would like to speak about multi-
lateral cooperation. As I mentioned previously, for more than
10 years I have been lobbying in Bulgaria and elsewhere for
the resurrection of an ‘old’ new slogan, ‘Spies of the world,
unite!’ I think one of the active approaches for fighting ter-
rorism is cooperation. I know that it is still utopian to think
about an international intelligence community but sooner or
later, and I hope sooner, it’s going to happen. The enemy is
a common enemy for all democratic societies and we ought
to find means to work together against the common enemy. I
would like to start with two quotations by UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, because I found in them answers to
some questions we have discussed these past two days. On
November 18, 1999, Kofi Annan said in a speech to the
General Assembly: ‘We are all determined to fight terrorism
and to do our utmost to banish it from the face of the Earth.
But the force we use to fight it should always be proportional
and focused on the actual terrorists.’ The second part of the
quotation: ‘We cannot and must not fight them by using their
own methods - by inflicting indiscriminate violence and terror
on innocent civilians, including children.’ I think everyone will
agree this ought to be our approach and reaction to terror-
ism. The second thing I think is important to mention is that
when you fight a shadow, because Bin Laden is a shadow, Al-
Qaeda is a shadow, the best way to fight the shadow behind
the scenes. I am not sure that using all possible military power
in the war against the terrorists of September 11th will be
more effective than, say, investing 1/100 of the money spent
for that war to fight an intelligence war. I personally believe
that the American services, with the help of other intelligence
services, would have been able to achieve the same results
within the same time frame - to catch Bin Laden and the
leaders of Al-Qaeda, and to take them to court – by using an
intelligence war. But this is my opinion. 
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Now, let’s talk about some problems. With the end of the
Cold War, terrorism has become Enemy Number One. A lot
of money has been spent not only by the American services
but all over the world to fight terrorism, and terrorists have
demonstrated the ability to hit any place and anyone. The
events on September 11 marked a huge fiasco for interna-
tional and national security services, and represented a
breakdown of the democratic world’s immune system. As I
said already, I felt responsible for what happened. I didn’t
have any personal ability to do anything. But if a sound
Bulgarian intelligence service had still been in existence, with
the abilities it had ten years ago, I am sure that it would have
been in a position to detect some preliminary signs. On
September 12 I wrote an article in a Bulgarian newspaper
saying the next strike would be a biological. Unfortunately, I
happened to be right. So biological, chemical, radiological,
and ecological attacks are all within the realm of internation-
al terrorism. And we cannot rule out terrorists’ ability to make
a nuclear strike at some point. An attack on global informa-
tion and communications systems would also be devastating.
I recall something Admiral Lacoste said during his first visit in
Bulgaria. He gave as an example illegal financial transac-
tions through the Internet and the fact that they represnet
more than mere financial transactions on the stock exchange.
If the attack is focused here, and it’s far from impossible, it
can cause horrendous repercussions. How can we protect
ourselves from these dangers? I see the solution in broad
international cooperation or, as I call it, ‘Spies of the world,
unite!’ 
I’d like to give some examples from Bulgarian experiences
fighting terrorism, and not just on a national level. General
Wolf will recall that the backbone of leftist terrorism in West
Germany was broken with the arrest of the Baader-Meinhof
group in Bulgaria, with the participation of Bulgarian coun-
terintelligence services. That happened in the 1970’s, and
created problems between the Bulgarian services and the
GDR because at that time, we were cooperating in the battle
against terrorism with ‘the enemy’, the West German servic-
es. The Bulgarian - Austrian agreement on combating inter-
national terrorism signed approximately at the same time cre-
ated another problem with Warsaw Pact members. We were
accused of trying to act neutral like Austria and then later
seeking to reach an agreement with NATO countries and so
on. The third example I would like to mention is the joint
operation, Desert Storm. One more thing is important. In
Bulgaria on April 8-10, 1992, representatives from 29 intel-
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held under the auspices of the Bulgarian President. The pro-
fessionals discussed one topic – ‘The Cold War is over, what
now?’ Terrorism was the main issue. So it all began in Sofia.
I know of no other official meeting prior to that where these
topics were discussed at such a high level. I will finish with the
fact that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister (UN General
Assembly speech on October 7, 1996) was the first to sug-
gest the need for intelligence sharing in fighting common
evils such as terrorism. I will finish with a potential invitation.
I hope to have the backing of the Bulgarian government and
the new Bulgarian President to hold another such meeting,
this time with a different format; that is, gathering together
active intelligence officers, politicians, and veterans, to dis-
cuss the same topic – international terrorism and how to fight
it. My final thought is this: Intelligence is not a force but an
instrument used to apply force. We must find common
denominators. We need new rules for a game that has no
rules. Maybe not official treaties like the Vienna Treaty but,
nonetheless, a new code of conduct, new rules, a new kind
of control and national and international oversight. I know
Dick still disagrees with this, but we’ll need international over-
sight and new level of accountability as well. 
Intelligence is the first line of defense. It was relatively easy to
count tanks and warheads. Now we need real insight, the
ability to analyze emotions and peoples’ ways of thinking,
and achieve a cross-cultural understanding. This once again
means cooperation. Finally, if the intelligence system is not
able to warn of catastrophes before they occur, then it is out-
dated and useless. I hope the intelligence community –
national and international - will make changes as result of the
tragic events of September 11th. Let’s hope this happens
sooner rather than later.
Tuðman: We are faced with a need for international cooperation,
intelligence cooperation not only in the field of terrorism but
also organized crime, drug trafficking, and smuggling of peo-
ple. Even in those areas it’s much easier to make an agree-
ment than undertaking the joint operation. On the other
hand, when we talk about international intelligence coopera-
tion it can be on at least two levels. First of all, it means mul-
tilateral cooperation between the services and international
organizations. But who will supply the organizations with
intelligence? That’s not often discussed, but when the func-
tioning of the organization changes, they will share at least
the same intelligence. It’s irrelevant how it will be collected. I
believe that bilateral cooperation is most important. There
are examples of effective cooperation but it’s often depend-
ent on the quality of the services, not other elements. But the80
main problem is that there probably will not be multilateral
cooperation because of the nature of terrorism. If they plan
activities in one country, train the people in another country,
finance from a third, and perform activities in a fourth, there
is no chance of avoiding multilateral cooperation. A joint
operation on a certain problem can be the first step toward
multilateral cooperation. Maybe we could begin with a small
number of services. One of the issues that we are faced with
after September 11 event is multilateral cooperation. I believe
there is a dire need for multilateral cooperation; otherwise,
terrorist organizations and criminal groups will use the
advantages of globalization.
Dedijer:ij Todor, you forget the liberation movements of the world.
You’ve got to look at terrorism in light of liberation move-
ments. The Kurds, the Chechens in Russia, they should be
free. The only weapon they had was terrorism. They didn’t
have tanks, they didn’t have F-16s, or anything else; they
used what they had. There is a danger in condemning all the
liberation movements. The second thing is that I think it’s
dangerous for the President to start infringing on democracy,
introducing new rules, and so forth. Democratization of intel-
ligence is happening going all over the world. There are
insight and control committees, parliaments and so on who
want to know what the intelligence agencies are doing. What
have they achieved? What have they missed? and all these
scandals, the press wants to expose that. Half the kids in the
world have access to information and they are eager to use
it. In that sense, there is a tremendous new wave going on in
the world. Senator Goldwater once said that half the intelli-
gence in the United States comes from their multinational
cooperations. Now the question is: will Government intelli-
gence supply the multinational cooperations or other coop-
erations in their country with the intelligence they get from
abroad and from other countries. This is big problem. If a
German firm finds that Sony is making a new product, will it
communicate it to the German firm and say ‘look what the
Sony is doing.’ 
Boyadjiev:ji We’re talking about the private sector and intelligence
agencies. There is a problem, and I do not see how it’s going
to be solved. The intelligence is paid for by taxpayer’s money.
You cannot use the information to help one company and not
help all the competitors. The only way is to make the infor-
mation public. I am afraid it is not going to happen soon.
About Steven’s remarks on liberation movements. I am not
talking about liberation movements because that’s another
topic. But I agree with you. The solution is a definition of ter-
rorism that will point out all the aspects and not leave room81
for speculation about liberators, freedom fighters, fighters for
human rights, and so on. When we are talking about terror-
ism, we are talking about a crime against humanity. I think
that is the answer. 
Kerr: I have a comment on multilateral intelligence. We do need
to establish a network and communications among the intel-
ligence services because of the complex problems in the
world today. Many of the problems that face us are global.
Although the countries involved in a particular crisis will
change, you cannot wait for the crisis to develop relation-
ships. If you do not exercise those connections you cannot
establish them when you need them. So you do need intelli-
gence relationships, just like you need diplomatic relations
and other relationships among countries. There are certain
areas, Miro mentioned some, where we can have broad
agreements for cooperation: terrorism, crime, narcotics, and
a variety of others that often involve law enforcement. There
are other areas where those partnerships can fluctuate and
involve some but not nations. I don’t think a UN intelligence
service is a practical idea. They have no assets, they have no
resources, they have no ability to keep secrets, and they have
no independent capability. Finally, on economic intelligence,
the CIA and other US organizations collect macro-economic
information. But intelligence organizations do not provide this
information to business. The Commerce Department sup-
ports US business (not very effectively, in my judgment) but
intelligence is concerned primarily with broad economic
trends, corruption, and specific issues such as oil. There is
macro analysis. For example, analysts do look at internation-
al banking, the larger economic situation in important coun-
tries, the future price of oil, and the impact of corruption and
underground economies. These are legitimate targets for
intelligence. Passing information on a foreign company to a
US company does not happen. That doesn’t mean compa-
nies don’t go out and try to collect that information, but US
intelligence is not involved in supporting one company over
another. A US ambassador in a country is obviously trying to
support US firms and give them insight and contacts, but
intelligence is not a player in that process. Maybe it should
be, but it isn’t.
Wolf:l I don’t know which type of international cooperation exists
now. I can only speak about the past. I think the way to coop-
erate in the fight against terrorism is bilateral cooperation.
We have seen the difficulties in European economic cooper-
ation. But this is another question. When intelligence services
exchange information, they have to protect their sources and
so on. During the last years of my active service, we had a82
project established by the Soviet Service, SOUD. I don’t know
how to translate this, but it was a recording done in Moscow,
using all possible technologies, of identified members of
secret services, intelligence services from Western countries,
suspicious persons, terrorists, and others of interest to the
services. It took a long time to prepare; eventually, all the
members of the Warsaw Pact agreed to contribute informa-
tion about such persons to the system, but every time we had
to decide what to give and what not to give. We had the for-
mal right to use the system to obtain information and answers
to certain questions, but this was sometimes a problem
because all the members had the right to use it. If we knew,
for example, the identity of a member of the American station
in India, we would provide the information. The whole thing
was an attempt to establish international co-operation. I
don’t know whether the CIA has agreements with other serv-
ices about exchange of information of that type. But this can
realistically only be done step by step. Todor said it could be
done very soon, in terms of fighting terrorism. I think it is nec-
essary to create some form of international monitoring in light
of the kind of terrorism we have been confronted with since
September 11th. As far as this issue is concerned, I do not see
a political problem in recognizing the leadership of the
American services; of course, on the basis of bilateral equal
rights for collecting, providing, and receiving information. 
Lacoste: A Secret Service is essentially at the service of its own
country and is one of the main symbols of the sovereignty of
the state.
However, a national Secret Service may share intelligence
with other foreign or Secret Services whenever its government
has given it a formal agreement to do so. But it not necessary
to share all one’s intelligence; it is normal and legitimate that
a country keep its national secrets to itself.
In wartime, within a military alliance against a common
enemy, military intelligence is usually fully integrated between
the allies, because operational objectives are well-defined. It
is not often so clear with political and strategic intelligence
when, for example, war goals are different. 
In peacetime, alliances are much looser; many other factors
can also affect political co-operation, not to mention the
sharing of secret Intelligence.
After September 11, 2001, many countries declared them-
selves ready to join the United States in their fight against
‘international terrorism’. What does this mean exactly for the
Secret Services ? We need to be aware of the difficulties and
limits of such cooperation.
Let me raise three points . 83
What exactly does the expression ‘international terrorism
mean’ ? It ultimately depends upon the context and, more-
over, terrorism is expressed in a variety of causes, forms,
degrees, and participants. 
In some situations it is limited to a single country; i.e., the Irish
IRA in the U.K., and the revolutionary Red Brigades in Italy. In
other situations it involves two or three countries simultane-
ously: the Basque ETA in Spain and France; the Kurdish PKK
in Turkey and Germany. 
Patriots fighting against an occupation army on their nation-
al territory are designated ‘terrorists’ by that army, and ‘resist-
ance fighters’ by themselves and their friends. Many terrorist
actions occurred during colonial wars, and were qualified as
such by the former colonial powers. The liberated people
called them liberation fighters. 
Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Israel has been
fighting against Palestinian terrorists; however, 50 years ago
the founders of Israel practised brutal terrorism against the
British army. From one point of view terrorists are criminals,
and from the opposite heroes!
When the spiral of violence and hatred is in motion, words
have no real significance on either side. After the World Trade
Center attack, the enemy was first designated by Americans
as ‘Islamic terrorism’. But this expression encompasses many
different models, such as Philippine terrorists, Hamas or
Hezbollah, Palestinian FPLP or FPLP-CG, Algerian GIA,
Egyptian Muslim Brothers, and so on. 
It is necessary to designate precisely which form of interna-
tional terrorism we are speaking of in order to fight against it.
Today we should state that our objective for the coalition is ‘
Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network’.
2 ) Several rules must be observed to achieve cooperation
between intelligence services.
First of all, one must take into account that there are differ-
ences in traditions and behavior between criminal police
investigators, foreign Secret Service agents, and customs offi-
cers. Even when there is a national ‘Intelligence Community’,
it is often difficult to achieve open and full co-operation
between those services (an example of this is the FBI, CIA,
and State Department investigations of Al Qaeda in Saudi
Arabia prior to September 11th). 
In Western Europe we have had good co-operation in crimi-
nal and terrorist affairs for quite some time. France initiated
the TREVI group among the police of several countries to
deal specifically with terrorism, the ‘Schengeningen’ proto-
cols to fight trans-national crime, and the EUROPOL system
to share police intelligence.84
I think it is sometimes easier to share intelligence between
specialists of the same branches from different countries than
between different services of the same country. But again it is
not necessary to share all criminal or terrorist intelligence; in
joint European organisations only what is of common interest
is shared; for example, when criminals are using open bor-
ders to operate in several countries. 
But intelligence is not the only issue; the justice systems are
also involved. There are many difficulties because of the dif-
ferences between national legal systems, procedures, and so
on. There might be some progress on this in Europe since the
New York and Washington attacks, as European governments
have agreed to determine ‘Judiciary European Space’.
However, it will take years to become fully operational. 
3– ‘Politicization’ of intelligence
When threatened by internal terrorism, many states prefer to
‘export’ the dangerous proponents to foreign ‘battlefields’
rather than keep them inside the country. The King of Jordan
did this when he expelled the Palestinian extremists (the infa-
mous ‘Black September’). The Saudis preferred to send their
fundamentalists to Afghanistan. The Syrian leader has been
brutal against his own extremists, and they now realize it is
impossible for them to survive in Syria. 
Other nations, for example Great Britain, have a tradition of
political asylum, and allow many well-known Arab extremists
to live freely in London, under the condition that they stay
away from trouble inside the UK. It is a ‘gentlemen’s agree-
ment’.
In other places, the terrorists may have friends or ‘fellow trav-
ellers’ in neighbouring countries. Some members of the
Italian Red Brigades received support in the early 1980s from
leftist radical groups in France, and the socialist government
looked the other way.
But it is not sufficient to have co-operation between just intel-
ligence and law enforcement services; the judiciary systems
must be involved as well. This is a big problem, because, of
the 15 countries of the European Union, several observe
‘Roman Law’, others British, and a third Scandinavian,
notwithstanding their specific procedural customs or legal
limitations (e.g. the present arguments about death sen-
tence).
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In conclusion, I strongly recommend that co-operation
between Intelligence Services against international terrorism
be organised under the principle of specific ‘task forces’, and
not through new bureaucratic, multinational structures.
Pragmatism is the rule here, and bilateral or trilateral teams
are more efficient than large organisations.     
Gömbös: I’d like to make some comments. I believe there are
two wars going on simultaneously: a military war and an
intelligence war led by the United States. Despite the anti-ter-
rorist coalition, responsibility for the intelligence war ulti-
mately cannot be shared. It is an American duty. An impor-
tant issue is the control of the movement of money. Access to
private banking information would be important. But this level
of information would give American intelligence services sig-
nificant commercial information. So some countries will be
hesitant to provide unfiltered information. The information fil-
tered by a state can tainted in many ways. There is the ques-
tion of what to do with secret accounts and covert corpora-
tions that provide a primary source of income for some coun-
tries. These countries will lose a source of income and will
therefore resist. There are many countries ready to co-oper-
ate in the war against the terrorism; for example, Russia and
Israel. But these countries are also tring to use the war for
their own interests. They are trying to influence the United
States to gain maximum benefits. Israel would like the main
thrust of the operation to be against Palestinian movements.
The Russians would like it to be directed against anti-Russian
movements such as the Chechens. The next issue is - Because
this is not only a military war but also an intelligence war, the
next issue is American operations upon partner territory. They
will want to limit American activities on their soil. The partners
will skew data, so the Americans will have to take into
account the laws of the host nation.
Cosic:i International intelligence cooperation is important, but we
have to be aware of practical limitations coming from conflict
of interests in multinational international missions and the
particular interests of each state. The failure of the UN in
Bosnia, and the problems of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR were the
result of disintegrated intelligence systems and the inability to
successfully integrate intelligence cooperation, since there
existed different interests and political attitudes among the
key international players in the multi-national missions. When
you have multinational missions, the games among the play-
ers can get intense. Different political interests limit intelli-
gence cooperation. Valuable conclusions can be drawn out
from the lessons learned in BiH.
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Ferš: I agree with Mr. Cosic that multilateral cooperation is dif-
ferent than bilateral cooperation. Who will lead it, what is the
main task and so on are some of the questions we have to
answer. But multilateral cooperation is necessary, and must
support it. Everything must be codified, but not a formal act
but by a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. We heard today that we
are playing a game; in multilateral cooperation, we do play
games but not a game of who will win or lose. It is a game
of trust. Without trust and clearly-defined tasks, multilateral
cooperation cannot exist. So we first identify the targets, prob-
lems, and tasks, and then we select the priorities. For some-
body with good multilateral cooperation, the priorities might
be terrorism or money laundering. Some services are more
effective in one area and others in another, but we never
divulge our sources. We then perform the concrete task. We
try to create a partnership because a partnership is better
than simple cooperation.
Meðimorec:i As far as I know, the Mediterranean countries are
cooperating multilaterally in the field of intelligence. A group
of European countries, members of NATO, have also formed
an intelligence community. Our service was not yet ready to
enter either of these organizations. We lacked the experience
for such a multilateral cooperation. But from the bilateral ties
we formed, especially working with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
intelligence service, we learned many lessons, the most
important being that when both the common individual inter-
ests of the state and the mutual interests of the two countries
were fulfilled, cooperation was successful. If there were no
such interests, intelligence cooperation was unsuccessful. The
best example is the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1995. After Dayton, foreign fighters and mujahedeens were
forced to leave the country. The Croatian and Bosnia and
Herzegovina services had both collected a lot of valuable
information about them. Later on, we shared this documen-
tation on the mujahedeen with European and overseas serv-
ices, and even with some Arab countries, all of whom were
happy to have information important for natio-nal security
and the struggle against terrorism. This was a prelude to the
events of September 11th. The spread of terrorism from
Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia
and back to the Middle East and Afghanistan marked the
beginning of the process, which culminated in the attacks on
the US. I repeat, when mutual interests are satisfied, cooper-
ation is possible. If there is trust between intelligence services
and a high degree of professionalism, multinational cooper-
ation can be successful.
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Lange: Tell me what would have to happen for mankind to unite
and heal this rift. Maybe if dangerous aliens were to land on
earth. But as far as I know, the September 11 terrorists are not
alien enough to bring about this international cooperation.
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